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I. INTRODUCTION
The world we live in is becoming smaller. Although no doubt
people have been saying that since at least the travels of Marco Polo,
Columbus, and Vespucci, events appear to be moving with startling
rapidity. Global trade, global travel, global communication-all are
bringing us together in ways that even twenty years ago we hardly
could imagine. The words "globalization" and "internationalization"
are heard frequently now, and in many new and different contexts.
In contrast to the globalization phenomenon, we are accus-
tomed to thinking about American federalism largely in domestic
terms. The primary arena in which the debate about the role of the
states plays out is a national one. Other than a few odd cases in
which state action has been challenged as interfering with interna-
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. A.B., University of Chicago, 1978; J.D.,
Georgetown University, 1982. I received a good deal of assistance thinking through the ideas in
this Article. For their generous help I thank Jon Charney, John Costonis, Dan Farber, Bob
Keohane, Don Langevoort, Hal Maier, Jerry Reichman, and Nick Zeppos. I also had the
extremely good fortune to be able to develop these ideas preliminarily while at the Rockefeller
Foundation's Conference Center in Bellagio, Italy. For that wonderful support, I thank the
foundation. I also thank the Symposium participants for a lively three-day exchange of ideas.
Beth Dunning contributed long hours of research assistance, for which I am indebted.
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tional relations,' or the even fewer cases in which actions taken by the
national government in the international sphere have been challenged
on federalism grounds, 2 most of the debate is about activity wholly
domestic. Foreign affairs usually is seen as something remote from,
although occasionally touching, the question of national-state rela-
tions.3
In the next century, the process of globalization is likely to
cause us to reconsider the way we think about federalism4 As the
world gets smaller, it will become more difficult to separate the do-
mestic and foreign spheres. Domestic regulation increasingly has an
impact on the international sphere, just as international integration
has important implications for domestic activities. This international
effect in turn triggers the foreign affairs powers of the national gov-
ernment, with regulatory implications for the states. In short, as the
barriers between countries fall, the lines we have drawn between the
national government and the states will come under increasing strain.
The challenge here is to begin to develop an understanding of
globalization's impact upon the American federal system. Part of
developing that understanding is getting an idea of how globalization
is proceeding, and the impact it likely will have on state regulatory
authority. Thus, Part I of this Article describes the process of globali-
zation as it relates to federalism concerns. Then, Part II samples
some of the multitude of state regulatory areas that globalization, in
one way or another, likely will affect. Next, it is useful to compare the
legal framework under which federalism concerns are addressed
when domestic regulation is at the fore with what likely would be the
standards against which state action is judged when international
relations is the issue. Thus, Part III canvasses the law regarding the
deference due the national government in foreign affairs, concluding
that, if anything, the governing law is even less solicitous to federal-
ism than the case law that has developed in the primarily domestic
area.
1. See, for example, Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
2. See, for example, Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
3. A recent article noting generally that globalization will have an impact on American
federalism is Lawrence T. Auerbach, Federalism In the Global Marketplace, 26 Urb. Lawyer 235
(1994).
4. In recognition of the impact of globalization upon American federalism, the Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations recently published a set of findings and recom-
mendations on state and local governments in international affairs. See Special Feature: State
and Local Governments in International Affairs--ACIR Findings and Recommendations, 20
Intergovernmental Perspective 33 (Fall 1993-Winter 1994).
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Finally, Part IV takes a stab at predicting the future, assessing
how this trend toward globalization, and the obvious impact it will
have upon federalism, likely will play out in the next century. While I
am not sanguine about the future of state authority in a globalized
world, I do think globalization may hold some unexpected promise for
localism. The very same pressures to uniformity and centralization
that are driving globalization will, I suspect, create new opportunities
for federalism. As bureaucracy is centralized and nationalized, it
inevitably loses touch with the people whom it is to serve. The
governed become alienated from the governors and seek to obtain
greater control over their government. This, for example, has been
the experience throughout the evolution of the European Union. And
it is in this insight that I think federalism's future may rest. As we
become subject to regulation that develops farther and farther from
our grasp, there will be a strong incentive to reinvigorate local and
state government, in order to return control over other aspects of our
lives to governments quite close to home.
II. GLOBALIZATION
It is a little difficult, and perhaps counterproductive, to offer
one specific definition for globalization, or internationalization. The
process is happening in so many areas that the term means every-
thing to everyone. Lack of an exact definition presents little problem,
however, for the process is so widespread that it is almost enough
simply to observe the phenomenon.
Even at the level of one's personal everyday life it is difficult to
ignore the process of globalization. On a recent trip from Nashville to
Orlando, I encountered travelers to Prague, a large group arriving in
Nashville from Asia, signs in the Orlando airport in Spanish and
English, and announcements in German as well. I drove in a
Japanese car, ate Cuban food, and found cappuccino readily available.
In Palm Beach I found newspapers from all over the globe and
watched European warmblood horses at work. More and more prod-
ucts, films, food, and periodicals are available from abroad. Most of
the world is relatively accessible to travel. The personal encounter
with internationalization only reflects a much broader and more mo-
mentous trend, however. The world is, at least in some ways, opening
19941 1443
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up.5 Products, people, and communications easily are crossing inter-
national boundaries.
Accompanying this internationalization of commerce is a simi-
lar process regarding regulatory authority. Just as recent years have
witnessed the tumbling of international boundaries and blockades,
there also has been significant growth in both the number of interna-
tional agreements that tie the world together, and the activity of
international organizations acting under those agreements.
Maastricht and the North American Free Trade Agreement
( NAFTA") are indicative of a movement toward regional integration,
at least at some levels,6 and the recently concluded Uruguay round of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT') was the most
thorough yet with regard to non-tariff barriers to trade.7
Developments such as these strengthen and cause greater reliance on
transnational organizations and regulatory authorities.8
While the process of globalization has been chronicled in many
different contexts elsewhere, for present purposes, what is interesting
is the extent to which the globalizing process mirrors the process of
"nationalization" that has occurred in this country, and the impact in
general terms that globalization will have. The balance in our federal
system depends upon the extent to which the national government
exercises regulatory authority: The Tenth Amendment leaves to the
5. While much of the world "globalizes," events in places such as Bosnia and Somalia
demonstrate that other parts of the world are fragmenting, often with tragic consequences.
Benjamin R. Barber, Global Democracy or Global Law: Which Comes First?, 1 Ind. J. Global
Legal Stud. 119, 121-24 (1993). See also text accompanying notes 236-48.
6. There is a wealth of literature on European integration, less on NAFTA. As to the
former, see, for example, William Wallace, ed., The Dynamics of European Integration (Pinter,
1990); Robert 0. Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann, The New European Community:
Decisionmaking and Institutional Change (Westview, 1991). As to NAFTA, see, for example,
Frederick M. Abbott, Regional Integration Mechanisms in the Law of the United States:
Starting Over, 1 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 155 (1993).
7. The Uruguay Round for the first time creates a formal international organization of
the World Trade Organization to enforce the Agreement. There is a burgeoning literature on
the Uruguay Round. See, for example, John H. Jackson, Dolphins and Hormones: GATT and
the Legal Environment for International Trade After the Uruguay Round, 14 U. Ark. Little Rock
L. J. 429 (1992); Matt Schaefer and Thomas Singer, Multilateral Trade Agreements and U.S.
States: An Analysis of Potential GATT Uruguay Round Agreements, 26 J. World Trade 31 (Dec.,
1992); Conference: Prospects for Multilateral Agreement on Services and Intellectual Property
in the GATT Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 19 Ga. J. Intl & Comp. L. 287 (1989). As of the
date of publication, the Congress of the United States was considering legislation to approve
United States participation in the WTO.
8. For an excellent study of international institutions and cooperation, see Robert 0.
Keohane, After Hegemony (Princeton U., 1984).
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states only that which is not delegated to the national government.9
While the rules of preemption leave sway for state regulation even of
delegated authority, state authority exists only so far as centralized
regulation permits. As every student of United States history knows,
the process of nationalization has occurred throughout our nation's
history, reaching a peak in this post-New Deal era.10 It turns out on
examination that close parallels exist between the impetus for, and
process of, globalization on the one hand, and nationalization on the
other. These parallels offer some suggestion as to where all this is
headed.
Public choice theory would attribute much of nationalization to
the pressure of domestic interest groups. Commentators have ob-
served the impetus for interest groups unable to obtain what they
desire at the state level simply to lobby the national Congress for the
regulatory solution they wish." Environmental regulation serves as
an example here, but so do civil rights regulation, consumer safety
regulation, and countless other regulatory schemes. This public
choice explanation also is offered to account for the internationaliza-
tion of law.12 Interest groups might be disenchanted with the result
reached in domestic politics and have some hope that international
accords will bring a more favorable domestic regulatory outcome. Or,
the interests of domestic groups might simply transcend national
boundaries. 3 An obvious example is environmental regulation. By
uniting with domestic groups from other nations, or by forming inter-
national interest groups, those seeking particular regulatory out-
9. The Tenth Amendment states: 'The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people." U.S. Const., Amend. Y.
10. See Cass R. Sunstein, DemocratizingAmerica Through Law, 25 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 949,
952 (1991). For a bold interpretation of the impact of the New Deal on American constitutional-
ijm, see Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations (Belknap, 1991).
11. Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic Theory of
Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76 Va. L. Rev. 265, 271-74
(1990), provides a public choice explanation for why federal regulators would ever choose to
favor state regulation.
12. An excellent account is offered in Anne-Marie Burley and Walter Mattli, Europe Before
the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration, 47 Intl Organization 41, 54-56 (1993)
(discussing neofunctionalism as a theory of integration and identifying actors above and below
the state level who promote integration to advance self-interest). See also Robert W. Hahn and
Kenneth R. Richards, The Internationalization of Environmental Regulation, 30 Harv. Int'l. L. J.
421, 429-31 (1989) (explaining the impact of interest-group pressure on international
regulation).
13. Burley and Mattli, 47 Int'l Organization at 55-56 (discussing the coalescing of national
interest groups at a supranational level in response to sectoral integration).
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comes may achieve their desired outcome if they can obtain agree-
ments at the international level.
Similarly, trade and commercial competition have contributed
both to nationalization and to internationalization. 14 Trade works
best when barriers are low;15 one, if not the best, way to lower barriers
is through centralized regulation (or perhaps deregulation) of trade. 6
Thus, commercial interests-interest groups themselves-seek inter-
national agreement. And nations that want a healthy economic envi-
ronment strive to eliminate barriers to trade and to open their mar-
kets.
Add to these forces the momentous and numerous technologi-
cal changes that have facilitated both nationalization and interna-
tionalization, and you start to get the whole story. Advances in tech-
nology have revolutionized the way we communicate, travel, and
trade. It is one thing to talk in theory about interest groups seeking
international regulatory regimes. It is quite another to visualize the
reality of this: teleconferencing, overnight couriers, global fundrais-
ing efforts, and the like. Similarly with international trade. While
centuries-old trade routes suggest the ancients moved some goods in
ways that astound us even today, the modern miracle is of quite a
different nature. Goods and services now move around the globe with
a rapidity that was difficult to perceive clearly even twenty years ago.
The direction we are headed is, and has been, dictated as much by
what science has accomplished for us as by political theory.
Although the impact of this internationalizing trend is varied
and vast, there is one result-the process of harmonization-that
plays a particularly significant role here. Harmonization is the vogue
international word for what is similar, in a sense, to the domestic
concept of uniformity.1' Uniform regulation is a necessary goal and
by-product of many of the forces outlined above. To cite an obvious
14. Barber, 1 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. at 129 (cited in note 5) (stating "McWorld is
ecological and technological, but most of all it is a product of popular culture driven by
expansionist commerce').
15. See Daniel A. Farber and Robert E. Hudec, Free Trade and the Regulatory State: A
GATT's-Eye View of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 1401, 1404-07 (1994). See
generally Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, International Competition Rules for the GATT-MTO World
Trade and Legal System, 27 J. World Trade 35 (Dec., 1993) (arguing for more competition rules,
in addition to rules prohibiting trade restraints, to ensure free trade).
16. Petersmann, 27 J. World Trade at 36-37 (explaining why, despite arguments in favor
of diverse trade regulation, there is a need for centralized uniform regulation of trade).
17. George A. Bermann, et al., eds., Cases and Materials on European Community Law 79
(West, 1992) (noting that "[hlarmonization' or 'approximation' denotes the process by which,
through community legislation of some sort, the laws of the Member States on a given matter




example, non-uniform regulation may be a significant barrier to trade:
opening up borders to trade requires a certain amount of harmoniza-
tion of the rules that affect international commerce. 18
This process of harmonization will have an important impact
on American federalism. In part, non-uniformity is inherent in the
idea of American federalism-the notion that fifty different states and
numerous local governments can go their own way in developing
regulatory frameworks. 19 This idea of non-uniformity has come under
tremendous strain in the last half century as the process of nationali-
zation proceeded. It is fair to say that in recent years, however, there
has been some slowing to the nationalizing trend, or at least more
rhetorical attention to concerns about local autonomy.20 But at the
same time, we are on the front end of a new wave of nationalizing,
this one brought about through international pressures. And with
this latest wave will come even more pressure to "harmonize," and a
concomitant pressure to reduce state autonomy.
III. THE IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION ON THE STATES
Although predicting the future is dicey business, it is impor-
tant to present some picture of how globalization will affect state
regulatory autonomy. This section strives to do so, identifying a host
of areas in which concerns for uniformity and change wrought by
international agreements may lead to limitations upon, or changes to,
state regulatory authority.
In considering the predictions made here, it is important to
bear in mind the forward-looking nature of the project. Some of the
changes here are almost certain to happen, and many will happen in
the near future to one degree or another. But there are other changes
18. Abbott, 1 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. at 156-57 (cited in note 6).
19. The classic citation is to Justice Brandeis' dissenting opinion in New State Ice Co. v.
Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932): "It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that
a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social
and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country." For an examination of
Brandeis' thesis and a skeptical conclusion, see Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and
Reelection: Does Federalism Promote Innovation?, 9 J. Legal Stud. 593 (1980).
20. See, for example, Federalism Initiative, 18 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 876 (1982)
(reporting President Reagan's remarks on federalism to a group of state and local officials). See
also Tim Golden, Governor Turns Florida Into His Lab for Change, N.Y. Times 16 (Aug. 11,
1991) (reporting on Florida Governor Lawton Chiles' efforts to reinvigorate local and state
government in that state). See generally David Osborne and Ted Gaebler, Reinventing




suggested that will be more distant, and whose future is more, to one
degree or another, uncertain. Resistance to some of the change dis-
cussed here has emerged consistent with attachments to local regula-
tion. But the hypothesis is that as the trend toward globalization
continues its inexorable course, such resistance will be overcome or
will simply dissipate. Thus, while some of what is described here is
easily imaginable, and is occurring, other aspects will appear more
tenuous. In considering the likelihood of these predictions, therefore,
one must put on future-seeing lenses: Things we would have been
skeptical about just a decade ago are happening now.
A Co-Regulation of Business and Industry
A likely place to begin is with a survey of some areas in which
states currently exercise a significant amount of regulatory authority
in conjunction with the federal government, but in which internation-
alizing pressures may require reconsideration of the states' roles. A
ripe beginning is regulation of industry and business.2 1 To a very
great extent, the growth of the national market and a need for
uniform regulation of commerce have been the primary impetus for
national regulatory schemes that preempt or limit regulation by the
states. Nonetheless, for political and historical reasons there remain
significant aspects of commerce over which the states maintain
important regulatory control. Globalizing pressures, however, are
likely to lead to increased calls to eliminate or further modify
independent state regulatory authority in these areas.22
One obvious area that comes to mind is regulation of the secu-
rities markets. This is an area in which, beginning in the 1930s, the
federal government took on a substantial regulatory role, assisted by
major pieces of federal legislation such as the Securities Act of 193323
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,24 and by federal agencies
such as the Securities Exchange Commission.25 Nonetheless, despite
a broad web of federal regulation, the states also continue to regulate
21. An excellent source on this, and of prime assistance in this part of the Article, is
Andreas Falke, The Impact of the International System on Domestic Structure: The Case of
American Federalism, which will be published in 39 Amerikastudien No. 3 (Autumn, 1994)
(manuscript copy on file with author). Falke's thesis is similar to mine, though his ultimate
conclusions differ. I also am indebted to Falke for a very useful discussion of these issues while
I was in Bonn last year.
22. Falke, The Impact of the International System at 3.
23. 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (1988).
24. 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (1988).
25. The Securities Exchange Commission was established pursuant to § 4 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. 15 U.S.C. § 78d (1988).
1448 [Vol. 47:1441
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securities. Every state in the Union retains some sort of "blue sky"
law.26 Issuers of securities must comply not only with the federal
regulations, but with state blue sky laws as well.27
Calls for abolition of separate state authority to regulate secu-
rities likely will gain force as international competitive pressures
increase. 8 Commentators criticize the existing system for its duplica-
tive nature, and for the confusing web of regulation it creates. 29 In
acknowledgment of some of these difficulties, many states have
adopted the Uniform Securities Law,30 proposed by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. But individual
state modifications of the uniform law and differing judicial interpre-
tations interfere with any progress toward uniformity, 31 and, at any
rate, the Uniform Act does little to eliminate dual national and state
regulation. In the meantime, the trend is toward uniformity in inter-
national securities regulation.32 For example, the European Union 33
('EU") is in the process of developing a uniform capital market.3 4 The
International Organization of Securities Commissions has recom-
mended harmonizing disclosure regulations to bring greater efficiency
26. Brian J. Fahrney, Comment, State Blue Sky Laws: A Stronger Case for Federal Pre-
Emption Due to Increasing Internationalization of Securities Markets, 86 Nw. U. L. Rev. 753,
757 (1992). State securities laws range from extremely strict regulatory requirements judging
securities transactions on their "merit" to a more "hands-off" approach exempting a majority of
transactions from regulatory requirements. Id. at 759-60.
27. Id. at 757.
28. The SEC, while ensuring that it fulfills its role as regulator to protect investors,
nonetheless has taken steps to "find solutions to problems to attract foreign issuers to our
markets." Richard Kosnik, The Role of the SEC in Evaluating Foreign Issuers Coming to U.S.
Markets, 17 Fordham Intl L. J. S97, S99 (Symposium, 1994).
29. See, for example, Fahrney, 86 Nw. U.L. Rev. at 757-58 (cited in note 26) (commenting
that the negative consequences of the dual system are higher costs to securities issuers, waste-
ful and inefficient compliance efforts, and confusion).
30. See id. at 761-62. The Uniform Securities Act was first drafted in 1956 and has been
repeatedly amended since. Id.
31. Id.
32. See Mark A. Sargent, A Future for Blue Sky Law, 62 U. Cinn. L. Rev. 471, 489-92
(1993) (describing the trend toward uniformity, but acknowledging obstacles). Although the
trend is toward uniformity, numerous contemporary commentators support international
regulatory diversity. See James D. Cox, Rethinking U.S. Securities Laws in the Shadow of
International Regulatory Competition, 55 L. & Contemp. Prob. 157, 158-59 (Autumn, 1992)
(noting, however, that these commentators "follow too simple a path" and that diversity can be
"both a blessing and a curse"). These commentators tend to focus on two main benefits of
diversity-regulatory competition and fostering experimentation and innovation. Id.
33. The "European Union" is the name of recent origin for what is perhaps more familiarly
known as the European Community ("EC") or the European Economic Community ("EEC"). I
adopt, except where plainly not relevant, the new terminology.
34. Fahrney, 86 Nw. U. L. Rev. at 768 (cited in note 26). In an effort to integrate the
market, the Council of the European Communities, the main governing body of the EEC, has is-
sued a number of directives that directly affect securities issuance. Id. at 769.
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to the international capital market. 5 Increasingly, the complicated
web of regulation in the United States interferes with the sale of
foreign securities in the United States and leads to growth in an off-
shore securities market not easily subject to control by United States
regulatory entities.
36
The difficulties associated with dual or multiple regulation of
the securities market and increased international pressures for uni-
formity lead to repeated calls for the preemption of state regulation of
securities.37 But while those calls have so far been resisted, regula-
tors already are modifying practices to adapt to pressures for har-
monization. 8 Most significantly, national and global issues increas-
ingly are exempt from blue sky requirements.3 9 Thus, in the face of
globalization, state regulatory authority already has been narrowed.
Globalizing forces also are at work in the area of banking,40
and with similar outcomes likely. Banking is regulated by both the
national and state governments, yet the regulatory scheme is ex-
tremely complicated, particularly at the national level and, some
would argue, Byzantine.41 But just as there are domestic political
35. Id. at 772.
36. See Cox, 55 L. & Contemp. Prob. at 159-60, 184 (cited in note 32) (discussing the
negative effects on U.S. markets of disparity in disclosure standards between the United States
and foreign markets and the ensuing disparity in transaction costs); Donald C. Langevoort,
Schoenbaum Revisited: Limiting the Scope of Antifraud Protection in an Internationalized
Securities Marketplace, 55 L. & Contemp. Prob. 241, 244 (Autumn, 1992) (observing that "[tihe
rapid internationalization of the securities markets has been driven [in part by] schemes of
regulation that can be avoided by off-shore activity"); Fahrney, 86 Nw. U. L. Rev. at 775 (cited in
note 26).
37. See, for example, Sargent, 62 U. Cinn. L. Rev. at 490-91 (cited in note 32) (discussing
SEC Chairman Breeden's calls for elimination of state regulation of international offerings);
Fahrney, 86 Nw. U. L. Rev. at 762, 776-77 (arguing that "[olutright pre-emption of the states'
laws is the only way out of the current regulatory morass," id. at 762).
38. See Fahrney, 86 Nw. U. L. Rev. at 773-74. For example, the SEC is currently working
toward a transnational securities offerings agreement with a number of nations. Id. at 773.
The SEC also has plans for a multi-jurisdictional disclosure system. Id. This system is
intended to be used by countries having a cross-border offering agreement with the United
States. Id. at 773-74. Finally, the SEC promulgated Rule 14(4)(A) which exempts from the 1933
Act transactions in the sale of foreign securities if the buyer of the securities resells the
securities. Id. at 774 n.175 (explaining the limits of the regulatory exemption). The rule is
intended to encourage the sale of foreign securities in the U.S. Id.
Commentators rejecting complete federal preemption of state regulation have argued that
this remedy is too extreme to accomplish the goal of state uniformity. Id. at 776. Rather, these
commentators prefer the adoption of uniform state laws and uniformity agreements. Id.
39. Sargent, 62 U. Cinn. L. Rev. at 491 (cited in note 32) (commenting that states are
"mostly irrelevant" in context of global securities market and discussing exemption of
international issues from blue sky rules).
40. F. William Hawley, Perspective of the Private Sector-Banking, 19 Ga. J. Intl & Comp.
L. 404,404 (1989).
41. See generally Falke, The Impact of the International System at 16-18 (cited in note 21)
(observing that the federal regulatory structure is highly fragmented between five separate
1450
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pressures to retain the states' role in regulation of banking, there are
enormous pressures to overhaul banking regulation entirely, most
probably in ways that would eliminate or curtail state regulation.42
Technology has a good deal to do with motivating banking
reform. As one commentator pointed out, "we are living in an instan-
taneous transaction type of global system which requires global multi-
lateral rules."4 The world of banking has changed dramatically in the
last decade or so, with banking by mail, by computer, and by ATM
replacing traditional notions of what it means to bank.44 But competi-
tiveness concerns equally play a major role here. The EU again is one
catalyst; liberalized rules for EU member states grant tremendous
competitive advantages, which may require the United States to re-
vamp its system to compete.45 While a new national regulatory
mechanism is considered, de facto states might be expected to focus
on regulating local institutions, leaving more and more the regulation
of national and international banks to national regulators.
Pressures of internationalization also are likely to be felt in the
regulation of the insurance industry,46 although in this area preemp-
tion may be much longer in coming.47 Unlike securities regulation,
the regulation of the insurance industry is almost completely a matter
of state control,48 authority that is jealously guarded.49 Nonetheless,
the need for uniformity has been felt and respected to a certain extent
in this sector as well, with associations such as the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners working toward uniform
laws and regulatory regimes.50 State governments and the insurance
companies themselves, however, heavily oppose the impetus toward
agencies that share supervisory responsibility and three separate statutes that shape the
system).
42. See id. at 3 (asserting that "[t]he increasing internationalization of financial markets
and investment, and their international regulation point to a future in which it may be difficult,
if not impossible, to maintain the autonomy of the states").
43. Hawley, 19 Ga. J. Intl & Comp. L. at 404 (cited in note 40).
44. Falke, The Impact of the International System at 20 (cited in note 21) (calling the
phenomenon "branchless banking").
45. Id. at 21-24.
46. See id. at 3.
47. See id. at 13-16 (noting that "t]he dual federalism in insurance may be hard to
challenge, and thus an adaptation to the realities of the international marketplace and
reciprocal international regulation hard to achieve").
48. See id. at 14 (noting that the current system is based on express U.S. congressional
policy to exempt the insurance industry from federal regulation).
49. See id. at 14 (commenting that "[alny attempts of the federal government to play a
more active role has [sic] ... actually led to an even stronger action by the states").
50. See id. at 14-15 (noticing that the actions of these voluntary associations is one of the
reasons for the lack of national action in the industry).
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national regulation.51 Nonetheless, events in the world at large may
at some point overtake the present state of affairs. Among the non-
tariff barriers subjected to agreement in the Uruguay Round of the
GATT were barriers affecting the international insurance business. 52
American insurers seeking access to markets abroad urged inclusion
of the business of insurance in the GATT. 53 But as events move for-
ward toward internationalizing the regulation of insurance, these
same insurers may find that they are compelled to accept federal
regulation in lieu of regulation by the states.
A related area in which state regulatory authority likely will
see some diminution is antitrust enforcement. Antitrust enforcement
authority currently rests relatively comfortably at both the federal
and state levels.M Indeed, unlike many other areas, there has been a
growth in recent years of the states' relative authority.55 Among
many commentators there is consensus that state antitrust regulation
can continue to play a role in the global economy.56 Nonetheless,
there are dissenting views as to the advisability of state-by-state
antitrust regulation.67 Moreover, state antitrust regulation of inter-
national businesses has raised sufficiently serious concerns to cause
some courts to interpret state authority quite narrowly.5 8 The global-
51. Id.
52. Claude E. Barfield, Services, Intellectual Property and the Major Issues of the Uruguay
Round, 19 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 307, 309 (1989); Falke, The Impact of the International
System at 7-8.
53. See Gordon J. Cloney, Impetus in the United States for the Liberalization of
International Trade in Services, 19 Ga. J. Intl & Comp. L. 314, 315-16 (1989) (asserting that
discriminatory and exclusionary policies in overseas insurance markets 25 years ago
"spearhead[ed] the reform of the entire international trade policy system").
54. For a general discussion of the division of authority between the state and federal
government, see Lloyd Constantine, Antitrust Federalism, 29 Washburn L. J. 163, 167-173
(1990); John Kincaid, Commentary: State Antitrust Law in the Context of a New
Intergovernmental and International Environment, 29 Washburn L. J. 188, 190-94 (1990).
55. See Alan R. Malasky, Commentary: Antitrust Federalism, 29 Washburn L. J. 185, 186
(1990) (observing that over the last decade much of traditional antitrust enforcement has been
passed to the states); Kincaid, 29 Washburn L. J. at 188 (terming the growth in state authority
a "renaissance [that] is part of a more general resurgence of the states in the American federal
system"); Constantine, 29 Washburn L. J. at 167 (noting that "It is rare for any major
development in antitrust law or policy to occur without eliciting the states' attention and
without bearing the mark of their influence").
56. See, for example, Kincaid, 29 Washburn L. J. at 194-97 (suggesting that the allocation
of power to the states increases their functionality and competitiveness in the world economy);
Barry E. Hawk, Internationalization of World Economies and State/Federal Antitrust Laws and
Policy, 29 Washburn L. J. 293, 293 (1990) (asserting that "internationalization of free world
economies does not require the abolition of either state or federal antitrust laws").
57. See generally Constantine, 29 Washburn L. J. at 176-81 (cited in note 54) (discussing
the social benefit, or lack thereof, of state antitrust enforcement).
58. See Hawk, 29 Washburn L. J. at 301 (cited in note 56) (citing The In Porters, S.A. v.
Hanes Printables, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 494 (M.D.N.C. 1987) and McGlinchey v. Shell Chem. Co.,
1985-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,672 (N.D. Cal. 1984), and further stating that "[sitate antitrust
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izing of international trade rules is likely to call further into question
a state-by-state antitrust policy, something addressed to a certain
extent by uniform guidelines developed by the National Association of
Attorneys General. 9 But there seems little doubt that the future will
involve some curtailment of state efforts in this area as well.6
°
B. The Impact of the GATT: The Future is Now
Reading the four fairly obvious examples set out above, one is
likely to argue that the future is now. The recently concluded
Uruguay Round of the GATT61 adopted rules that will begin the proc-
ess of change to uniform regulation in at least some of the areas men-
tioned above, such as banking and insurance. But GATT has done
very much more; indeed, if and as the latest GATT agreements be-
come domestic law, there will be further-and in some instances
significant--changes in the regulatory role of the states, all brought
on by the internationalizing of trade.6 2
GATT is a multilateral agreement that serves as the primary
international means of regulating trade.63 GATT provisions do not
automatically become domestic law, however.64 As an "agreement,"
rather than a treaty, the President has authority to negotiate and
enter into the GATT accords without the approval of the United
States Congress.65 To the extent that implementation of the
agreement requires the enactment of legislation, however, the
laws ... should be interpreted and enforced with greater sensitivity to foreign government
interests given the potential interference with U.S. foreign relations").
59. See Constantine, 29 Washburn L. J. at 167 n.41, 168 (cited in note 54).
60. See Hawk, 29 Washburn L. J. at 295 (cited in note 56) (noting that U.S. foreign in-
vestment needs suggest a limited role for state antitrust efforts in some areas with an interna-
tional dimension such as mergers and acquisitions).
61. The results of the Uruguay Round can be found in Final Act Embodying the Results of
the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, GATT Doc. MTNIFA ("1994 GATT Final
Act").
62. See note 7 regarding the current status of the GATT in the United States.
63. On the history and workings of the GATT, see generally Robert E. Hudec, The GATT
Legal System and World Trade Diplomacy (Butterworth, 2d ed. 1990) and John H. Jackson,
World Trade and the Law of GATT (Bobbs-Merrill, 1969).
64. On the implementation of the GATT in the United States, see generally John H.
Jackson, United States Law and Implementation of the Tokyo Round Negotiation, in John H.
Jackson, Jean-Victor Louis, and Mitsuo Matsushita, eds., Implementing the Tokyo Round.
National Constitutions and International Economic Rules, 139-97 ("Tokyo Round") (U. of Mich.,
1984).
65. See id. at 145. Compare generally, Michael J. Glennon, Constitutional Diplomacy 177-
91 (Princeton U., 1990) (discussing the reaches and limits of the President's authority to enter
into international executive agreements without Congressional approval); Louis Henkin,
Foreign Affairs and the Constitution 173-188 (Foundation, 1972); Restatement (Third) of
Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 303, Comment e (ALI, 1987).
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Congress plays an important role.66 For example, the necessary con-
gressional participation threatened the success of the 1972 and 1973
Tokyo Round of the GATT, which was the first to concern itself with
non-tariff barriers.67 In order to involve itself without constantly
derailing trade agreements after the fact, therefore, Congress in 1974
passed legislation creating a special "fast track" procedure for trade
legislation.8 This procedure requires that Congress be notified ninety
days before the President signs an agreement on non-tariff barriers,
and then provides streamlined methods for enacting domestic legisla-
tion.6
9
Prior to the Uruguay Round, most of the GATT negotiations
had involved trade in goods. 0 With regard to these negotiations, state
authority was involved little and remained reasonably intact. The
only issue of significance to the states was negotiation at the Tokyo
Round about government procurement policies, but this negotiation
did not result in binding subnational governments.
7 1
In sharp contrast to prior negotiations, the Uruguay Round of
the GATT adopted rules in many areas that will affect state regula-
tory authority.72 Significant areas of agreement that will have an
impact on the states include the agreements on Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures, 73 Technical Barriers to Trade, 74
66. See Jackson, Tokyo Round at 145 (cited in note 64) (noting that for years Congress
refused to recognize the GATT).
67. Id. at 146-47.
68. See id. at 147-49.
69. Id. at 148.
70. See Falke, The Impact of the International System at 8 (cited in note 21) (observing
that the Uruguay Round brought services within the gambit of GATT for the first time).
71. Jackson, Tokyo Round at 143-45 (cited in note 64). Jackson reports that the United
States negotiators were prepared to agree to an international government procurement rule
that would bind the states in federal nations, but that other foreign negotiators opposed this
provision. Id. at 144. Nevertheless, Jackson questions whether such a provision would be
constitutional, suggesting that it is arguable "that purchases by state government is a matter so
intimately connected with normal sovereign and administrative authority reserved to the states
that the federal government would not have the [constitutional] authority to enter into an
international agreement that constrained or interfered with that sovereignty." Id. at 143-44.
72. Schaefer and Singer, 26 J. World Trade at 31 (cited in note 7); Pete Du Pont,
Federalism in the Twenty-First Century: Will States Exist?, 16 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol. 137, 143
(1993).
73. 1994 GATT Final Act, Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures ("1994 GATT SPS Agreement"), ll-A1A-4. See generally Schaefer and Singer, 26 J.
World Trade at 43-46.
74. 1994 GATT Final Act, Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade ('TBT j, H-AlA-6.
See generally Schaefer and Singer, 26 J. World Trade at 36-43. See also Conrad Weiler, GATT,
NAFTA and State and Local Powers, 20 Intergovernmental Perspective 38, 39-40 (Fall 1993-
Winter 1994).
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Trade in Services, 75 Government Procurement,76 and Subsidies.77
Regulatory harmonization is in large part the goal of these
agreements; 78  thus, state regulatory autonomy necessarily is
implicated.79
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the GATT agreement
with regard to state regulatory autonomy is the agreement respecting
Technical Barriers to Trade ('TBT"). Technical barriers to trade are
mandatory measures that regulate products, as well as their packag-
ing and the process of production.80 The theory behind agreements
such as the TBT is that as the ability to impose obvious economic
barriers to trade, such as tariffs, is eliminated, governments will im-
pose more subtle barriers, in the form of technical regulation and the
like.81 Thus, a government might impose packaging, labeling, or test-
ing standards that in practice provide a competitive advantage to
domestic goods and discriminate against foreign commerce.
75. 1994 GATT Final Act, General Agreement on Trade in Services ("GATS'), il-AIB. See
generally Schaefer and Singer, 26 J. World Trade at 53-56. See also, Weiler, 20
Intergovernmental Perspective at 39.
76. 1994 GATT Final Act, Agreement on Government Procurement ("GP'), II-A49(b). See
generally Schaefer and Singer, 26 J. World Trade at 56-57. See also, Weiler, 20
Intergovernmental Perspective at 39.
77. See generally 1994 GATT Final Act, Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures ("SCM"), II-A1A-13. See generally Schaefer and Singer, 26 J. World Trade at 47-53.
78. See Katherine Tammaro, Why the States Should Worry About GATT in Center for
Policy Alternatives, Policy Alternatives on the Environment: A State Report 7, 8 (Aug., 1992);
Jackson, 14 U. Ark. Little Rock L. J. at 447 (cited in note 7) (suggesting, however, that
"harmonization can probably only be pushed to a limited degree, at least at the broader world-
wide level (as compared to regional, or federal-state systems)").
79. See Tammaro, Why the States Should Worry About GATT in Policy Alternatives at 8
(positing that -[h]armonization' could strip states of their authority over key health and safety
issues and prevent independent regulation by the states"). Although state laws that are
inconsistent with international GATT standards are not automatically invalid, they are subject
to GATT and to challenges by objecting nations. Id. at 13. Furthermore, under GATT the
United States must take reasonable measures "to ensure observance of GATT by regional and
local governments." Id. For a discussion of internationalization in yet another area under the
Uruguay Round, see generally J. H. Richman, The TRIPS Component of the GATT's Uruguay
Round: Competitive Prospects for Intellectual Property Owners in an Integrated World Market, 4
Fordham Intell. Prop., Media & Ent. J. 171 (1993).
80. Technical regulations are defined in 1994 GATT Final Act, TBT, ll-A1A-6, Annex 1.1
(cited in note 74). See also Schaefer and Singer, 26 J. World Trade at 38-39 (cited in note 7).
81. John H. Jackson, Jean-Victor Louis, and Mitsuo Matsushita, Law and World
Economic Interdependence, in John H. Jackson, Jean-Victor Louis, and Mitsuo Matsushita, eds.,
Implementing the Tokyo Round: National Constitutions and International Economic Rules 1, 12
(U. of Mich., 1984) (stating "[b]ecause tariffs had been reduced over several decades, nontariff
barriers had become significant restraints on international trade and major obstacles to further
trade liberalization").
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Although the goal of the TBT Agreement is to eliminate dis-
crimination against foreign trade,82 the mechanism for achieving this
may sweep more broadly.83 Discrimination need not be facial; it may
be challenged in effect.84 Once so challenged, the question becomes
whether the regulation is broader than necessary to protect legitimate
interests such as the health and safety of citizens.85 In defining what
technical standards are acceptable, however, the GATT refers largely
to existing international standards. 6 If a government wants to im-
pose barriers in excess of existing international standards, or to im-
pose standards where no international standard exists, the govern-
ment bears a heavy burden of proof.8 Signatory states must adhere
to "recommendations" of appropriate technical standards; 8 failure to
do 'so may subject the signatory state to economic sanctions.8 9
Accompanying the ban on unnecessary technical barriers are elabo-
rate provisions for notice and comment about the imposition of techni-
cal standards. 90
The impact of the technical barriers agreement may not even
yet be fully appreciated; nonetheless, there are obvious areas in which
state regulatory autonomy is in jeopardy. The impact of the TBT may
well be to limit, to some extent, state authority to protect citizens
82. See Schaefer and Singer, 26 J. World Trade at 39 (cited in note 7) (noting that the TBT
Agreement prohibits state governments from discriminating "between domestic and foreign
goods or between goods from different foreign countries"); Weiler, 20 Intergovernmental
Perspective at 39 (cited in note 74).
83. See Schaefer and Singer, 26 J. World Trade at 38 (contemplating that "the Agreement
may significantly constrain state regulatory freedom and powers in favor of broader,
internationally harmonized standards.. . [and] may indeed require the Federal government to
modify legislation delegating regulatory power to states to ensure that they comply with certain
obligations under the TBT Agreement").
84. See Farber and Hudec, 47 Vand. L. Rev. at 1421-31 (cited in note 15) (noting that
recent GATT jurisprudence indicates that disproportionately burdensome effects are a violation
of GA1T); Schaefer and Singer, 26 J. World Trade at 39-40.
85. 1994 GATT Final Act, TBT, 1I-AIA-6, Art. 2.2 (cited in note 74). See Schaefer and
Singer, 26 J. World Trade at 39; Farber and Hudec, 47 Vand. L. Rev. at 1433-34.
86. 1994 GATT Final Act, TBT, 1l-A1A-6, Art. 2.4. See also Schaefer and Singer, 26 J.
World Trade at 39.
87. See Schaefer and Singer, 26 J. World Trade at 40 (stating "[w]here an international
standard exists and it has not been followed it would appear that a party would have to explain
the justification in terms of a fundamental, objective condition that makes the international
standard 'ineffective or inappropriate"'); Tammaro, Why the States Should Worry About GATT,
in Policy Alternatives at 9 (cited in note 78) (discussing state recycling laws).
88. See Schaefer and Singer, 26 J. World Trade at 39,42.
89. See id. at 35-36 (indicating that some available economic sanctions are compensation
and suspension of concessions).
90. 1994 GATT Final Act, TBT, ll-A1A-6, Art. 2.9-2.10 (cited in note 74). See also
Schaefer and Singer, 26 J. World Trade at 40 (noting that these obligations arise when a
proposed technical regulation "is not in accordance with the relevant international standard (or
an international standard does not exist)").
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from risks to health and safety."' The extent to which this is true is a
matter of very sharp controversy.92 Only time will reveal precisely
how broad the TBT Agreement's impact is. Nevertheless, examples of
laws that will be subject to challenge and perhaps invalidation under
the TBT include recyclability of goods requirements, regulation of
beverage caps and beverage container disposal methods, and varying
emissions standards such as those in place in California.
93
Closely related to the TBT is the agreement regarding
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures ("S&P Measures"). Indeed, it
is difficult for some to see where one agreement ends and the other
begins.94 Generally speaking, S&P Measures are those taken to en-
sure the safety of human, animal and plant life and health.95 S&P
Measures seem to relate particularly to regulation of additives and
toxins in foods, and protection against imports that threaten to carry
pests or diseases.96 The regulatory framework is similar to that of the
TBT97 International standards generally are to govern.98
Here, too, there is sharp disagreement about impact, but evi-
dently there will be some displacement of state regulatory authority. 99
As with many aspects of the Uruguay Round, the United States was
at the forefront in negotiating this agreement, concerned about
European banning of American beef that had been raised using
91. Tammaro, Why the States Should Worry About GATT, in Policy Alternatives at 8 (cited
in note 78); Farber and Hudec, 47 Vand. L. Rev. at 1409-10 (cited in note 15).
92. See, for example, Schaefer and Singer, 26 J. World Trade at 38 (cited in note 7) (noting
that conclusions by environmentalists that Congress will be required to establish federal pre-
emption standards in every case "appear to overstate the consequences and effects of these
provisions").
93. See Weiler, 20 Intergovernmental Perspective at 39 (cited in note 74) (mentioning a
1992 EEC challenge to numerous U.S. state and local laws including a California glass food and
beverage cap recycling law). For analysis on specific examples of threatened state and local
laws, see Tammaro, Why the States Should Worry about GATT, in Policy Alternatives at 9-13
(cited in note 78) (discussing the potential effects of GATT on various state and local laws
regulating recycling and waste reduction, clean air, pesticide control, and wildlife and natural
resources).
94. See Schaefer and Singer, 26 J. World Trade at 36-37 (cited in note 7) (noting that
although the two agreements are not intended to overlap, their exact relationship is not entirely
clear).
95. 1994 GATT SPS Agreement, lI-A1A-4, Annex A.1 (cited in note 73); Schaefer and
Singer, 26 J. World Trade at 37.
96. 1994 GATT SPS Agreement, II-A1A-4, Annex A.1; Schaefer and Singer, 26 J. World
Trade at 37.
97. Schaefer and Singer, 26 J. World Trade at 43-44.
98. 1994 GATT SPS Agreement, II-A1A-4, 1 9; Schaefer and Singer, 26 J. World Trade at
45.
99. See Schaefer and Singer, 26 J. World Trade at 44 (commentating that "the [S&P]
Decision may significantly constrain state regulatory freedom and powers in favor of
scientificallyjustified regulations and internationally harmonized standards").
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growth hormones.100 But liberalization works in two directions.
Commentators have identified numerous state laws that might be
subject to invalidation.1 1 Examples might include, again, bottle bills,
as well as state food and water labeling requirements, and prohibi-
tions on certain toxic ingredients.
Of almost equal importance to state regulatory authority likely
will be the General Agreement on Trade in Services.102 This agree-
ment may represent the most significant action of the Uruguay
Round. Recognizing that the world economy is as much run by the
service sector as by trade in goods, negotiators sought °3 and obtained
liberalization in the trading in services. The general thrust of the
agreement as to services is that all service suppliers of signatory
countries should receive "most-favored nation" treatment,04 that
barriers to market access should be eliminated,105 and that measures
should be taken to eliminate licensing and qualifications as barriers
to the free trade in services. 0 6
Obviously, the agreement has a potentially vast impact on
state regulatory authority. A key area of state regulation is that of
individuals working within the state. The services agreement of
GATT, however, likely will begin to lead to the breakdown of state
regulation of banking and insurance, as well as the telecommunica-
tions industry.0 7  Other candidates to be removed from individual
state regulatory regimes include accounting, engineering, construc-
tion, travel, and a favorite no doubt of anyone reading this, the prac-
tice of law. 08 State regulatory authority over trade in services likely
will have to undergo careful examination.
Two other aspects of GATT deserve notice. First, the Uruguay
Round places local government procurement under GATT scrutiny,
calling into question the already questionable buy-American laws.109
100. See Jackson, 14 U. Ark. Little Rock L. J. at 435-36 (cited in note 7); Farber and Hudec,
47 Vand. L. Rev. at 1410 n.23 (cited in note 15).
101. See Du Pont, 16 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Policy at 143-44 (cited in note 72).
102. Final Act, GATS, II-A1B (cited in note 75).
103. See John H. Jackson, International Competition in Services: A Constitutional
Framework 4 (American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1988). On the major
role of services in the world economy today, see generally Geza Feketekuty, International Trade
in Services: An Overview and Blueprint for Negotiations, 37-58 (Ballinger, 1988).
104. Final Act, GATS, II-A1B, Part III (cited in note 75).
105. Jackson, International Competition in Services at 8-9 (cited in note 103).
106. See Schaefer and Singer, 26 J. World Trade at 54-55 (cited in note 7).
107. See id. at 53 n.47; Weiler, 20 Intergovermental Perspective at 40 (cited in note 74).
108. Weiler, 20 Intergovernmental Perspective at 40.
109. See Falke, The Impact of the International System at 12 (cited in note 21) (noting that
because of the impact of the Uruguay Round the National Association of Governors has called
for elimination of buy-American provisions in state and local procurement contracts); Note,
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Finally, the Uruguay Round strengthens controls on subsidies to
various industries and specifically applies the subsidy prohibitions to
the states."0 These rules will have an impact upon state programs to
encourage exports through subsidies and tax exemptions,"' and may
have an impact on aid to research programs at universities and even
on aid to depressed areas or regions of a state."2
This last point touches on an interesting twist in federal-state
relations that also is likely to come under increasing pressure in
future years. Just as the national sphere has expanded at the ex-
pense of state autonomy, the states have taken on a greater role in-
ternationally. Many states have trade programs and it is a priority of
state government to seek out foreign investment."1 There is some
question whether any of these programs will need to be dismantled
under the GATT. States have also tried to express themselves on
matters of international concern such as apartheid and nuclear dis-
armament." 4 Already the case law is not favorable to state efforts to
participate in the international arena,"5 but the process of harmoni-
zation suggests an even smaller, not greater, role for the states.
C. The NAFTA
Of course, running closely on the heels of the GATT is a recent
important development at home: approval by Congress of the North
State Buy-American Laws--Invalidity of State Attempts to Favor American Producers, 64 Minn.
L. Rev. 389, 390-91 (1980). Compare Jackson, Tokyo Round at 143-44 (cited in note 64)
(discussing the impact of the Tokyo Round on state buy-American laws and suggesting that the
laws might not be constitutionally valid).
110. Schaefer and Singer, 26 J. World Trade at 47 (cited in note 7).
111. Id. at 51 & n.42 (noting that tax exemptions that apply only to export sales of export-
ing trading companies are prohibited by GATT).
112. Id. at 48-49.
113. A good early article anticipating the growth of state activity encouraging international
trade and discussing the difficulties with state involvement in the area is Harold G. Maier,
Cooperative Federalism in International Trade: Its Constitutional Parameters, 27 Mercer L.
Rev. 391 (1976). See also Richard B. Bilder, The Role of States and Cities in Foreign Relations,
83 Am. J. Int'l L. 821, 821-22 (1989); Falke, The Impact of the International System at 2 (cited in
note 21).
114. See Bilder, 83 Am. J. Int'l L. at 822; Johanna S. R. Mendelson, Foreign Policy By
Federalism: The Reagan Years, 21 U. Miami Int-Am. L. Rev. 81, 83 (1989).
115. See, for example, Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968). For a discussion of
Zschernig and the confusion it has wrought, see Harold G. Maier, The Bases and Range of
Federal Common Law in Private International Matters, 5 Vand. J. Transnational L. 133, 136-59
(1971) (arguing, at 151, that "Zschernig, taken as a whole, does not provide an effective tool for
identifying the division of state and federal power in private international cases"). For a
discussion of state efforts in the international arena and the case law surrounding such efforts,
see Mendelson, 21 U. Miami Int-Am. L. Rev. at 93-117.
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American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"). 116 It is difficult to assess
yet exactly what NAFTA's impact will be on state regulatory auton-
omy.17  Several things are apparent, however. First, the NAFTA
adopts many of the approaches of the GATT, such as rules relating to
-technical barriers, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, and gov-
ernment procurement. 1 8 Second, there are instances in which the
NAFTA is more specific than the GATT, such as its discussion of the
development of specifically allowable automotive goods standards, 19
emissions standards, and its elaborate guidelines on the practice of
law from country to country.' 20 Third, the NAFTA contains specific
provisions-as does the GATT, but the direction seems clearer
here-for future liberalization.' 2' Finally, the NAFTA sets up a pleth-
ora of committees to recommend future measures that will increase
harmonization.122 All of these aspects of the NAFTA are going to have
an impact similar to, yet likely more direct and immediate than, the
GATT.
The preceding discussion provides a fairly good indication of
the direction in which matters are headed. There are forces at work
bringing the world closer together, but those very same forces demand
greater uniformity and coordination of regulation. The result is a
narrowing of the state regulatory sphere. Some of the areas of nar-
rowing are perhaps not surprising, dealing as they do with the inter-
national market economy. This is but a logical extension of the state
of affairs under the domestic Commerce Clause, although it in some
ways or applications may sweep more broadly.' 23 Many of the regula-
tory areas subject to internationalization, though, increasingly touch
upon the central role of the states, protecting the health and safety
116. North American Free Trade Agreement, reprinted in 32 Intl Legal Materials 605
(1993) ("NAFYA").
117. Among other problems, the NAFTA is, in currently available form, enormous and
unindexed.
118. On rules relating to technical barriers, see NAFTA, Ch. 9; on rules relating to sanitary
and phytosanitary measures, see NAFTA, Ch. 7; and on rules relating to government procure-
ment, see NAFTA, Ch. 10. See also Weiler, 20 Intergovernmental Perspective at 41 (cited in
note 74) (stating that "[ciritics worry that GATT interpretations may well apply to NAFTA
language" in some areas).
119. NAFTA, Annex 913.5.a-3 (listing four specific criteria to be applied).
120. NAFTA, Annex 1210.5, Section B.
121. See, for example, id. (setting out the goal of, and steps for, future liberalization in the
area of foreign legal consultants).
122. Some examples of these committees include the Land Transportation Standards
Committee, NAFTA Annex 913.5.a-1, the Telecommunications Standards Subcommittee,
NAFTA Annex 913.5.a-2, and the Automotive Standards Council, NAFTA Annex 913.5.a-3.
123. But see Farber and Hudec, 47 Vand. L. Rev. at 1405 (cited in note 15).
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and welfare of their citizens. The flip side of such regulation often is
impairment of free trade, however, and it is the latter that likely will
carry the day.
The following sections on the impact of internationalization are
of special interest. The first is, in a sense, a continuation of the pre-
ceding discussion, but treated separately because of the extremely
sensitive nature of the matters that may now face preemption under
an international regime. The second section deals with human rights.
D. Special Prerogatives of the States
When the Supreme Court overruled National League of Cities
v. Usery,124 formal legal protection for the idea of separate "enclaves"
of state authority seemed unlikely in the future.125 Nonetheless, by
reason of tradition or politics or both, there are certain areas in which
states exercise regulatory authority that are considered sacrosanct to
a certain extent. But in the global village, there likely will be change,
even in these unique domains of state authority. The areas discussed
here are regulation of alcoholic beverages, taxation, and education.
In a sense, there is nothing uniquely sovereign about the regu-
lation of alcohol that ought to make it more important to the states
than regulation of, say, waste disposal or food additives. But as a
matter of history, or historical accident, regulation of alcohol is an
area in which the states have and defend primacy. The price for re-
pealing prohibition was local choice: The Twenty-first Amendment
quite categorically gives to the states authority to regulate alcohol.26
In the face of international trade agreements, however, even
this sphere of relative state autonomy is threatened. In the Beer I
124. 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (overruled by Garcia u. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 546-47 (1985)).
125. Thomas R. McCoy and Barry Friedman, Conditional Spending: Federalism's Trojan
Horse, 1988 S. Ct. Rev. 85, 96. For a discussion of the "enclave" construct of federalism, see
John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 693, 701-04 (1974); Raul Berger,
Federalism: The Founders' Design 49-76 (U. of Okla., 1987). For literature discussing the
demise of the enclave construct after Garcia, see, for example, Zoe Baird, State Empowerment
After Garcia, 18 Urban Law. 491 (1986); Martha A. Field, Comment, Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority: The Demise of a Misguided Doctrine, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 84
(1985).
126. U.S. Const., Amend. XXI. Although the states have the authority to regulate alcohol
under the Twenty-first Amendment, recently the federal government has again begun to usurp
those powers through the spending power by mandating a minimum drinking age in return for
federal road construction funds. Du Pont, 16 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol. at 140-41 (cited in note 72).
Furthermore, this federal exercise of power in the realm of alcohol has been upheld by the
Supreme Court. See South Dakota u. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
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case,127 a GATT panel ruled that various taxes and regulations of
some forty-one states violated the GATT.128 The GATT panel further
ruled that, despite the Twenty-first Amendment, the state laws do not
impose "requirements which the United States could not change, or
indeed has not already overruled, by executive action, including, in
this case, acceptance by the United States of the obligations under the
General Agreement as part of United States federal law.''129 Thus, the
panel recommended that the United States bring its inconsistent
state and federal laws into conformity with GATT requirements. 130
The United States has endeavored to see that those practices are
changed.13
Of far greater sanctity and importance to the autonomy of the
states is state authority to tax.3 2 There are rules, of course, that limit
state taxing practices, such as the doctrine of intergovernmental tax
immunity.133 But by and large the states are free-and insist upon
the freedom-to design their tax structures as they wish, taxing what
they wish, and to the extent they wish. Domestically, this autonomy
in the taxation area necessarily has become more difficult as the mar-
ket integrates. States have developed schemes to tax many articles of
interstate commerce, and parties increasingly challenge state taxing
practices.' 34 But the Supreme Court, while striking down discrimina-
tory taxes,135 has remained fairly deferential to state taxing decisions,
including decisions that involve taxing international concerns.13
There are two forces, however, that threaten state autonomy in
the area of taxation. The first is that state taxes imposed upon inter-
127. GATT Panel Report, United States-Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages
("Beer II") (1992), reprinted in 4 World Trade Materials 25 (September, 1992).
128. Beer I at 98-101, reprinted in 4 World Trade Materials at 122-25. See also Schaefer
and Singer, 26 J. World Trade at 33 (cited in note 7). The very fact of state-by-state regulation
made the entire proceeding enormously complicated.
129. Beer II at 87-88, reprinted in 4 World Trade Materials at 111-12.
130. Id. at 101, reprinted in 4 World Trade Materials at 125.
131. Schaefer and Singer, 26 J. World Trade at 32 n. 7, 33 (cited in note 7); Tamarro, Why
the States Should Worry About GATT, in Policy Alternatives at 7 (cited in note 78).
132. See generally Daniel Shaviro, An Economic and Political Look at Federalism in
Taxation, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 895 (1992) (discussing importance to states of power to tax).
133. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheaton) 316, 326-30 (1819).
134. For example, Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803 (1989); New Energy
Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269 (1988).
135. See, for example, the cases cited in note 134.
136. See, for example, Itel Containers International Corp. v. Huddelston, 113 S. Ct. 1095
(1993) (upholding state tax on containers used exclusively in international commerce);
Franchise Tax Bd. of Calif. v. Alcan Aluminum Ltd., 493 U.S. 331 (1990) (applying Tax
Injunction Act to bar federal challenge to state tax by foreign parent corporations); Shell Oil Co.




national trade are subject to increasing criticism. A classic example is
the unitary tax imposed on foreign corporations. 137 Taxes such as
these are likely to come under increasing scrutiny.138
But even more problematic with regard to state autonomy are
some recent suggestions that differing state tax bases and tax rates
are threatening United States competitiveness. 3 9 The argument is
that markets such as the EU, which are moving toward greater uni-
formity, will attract firms sensitive to tax levels and heterogeneity.140
Moreover, competitiveness depends upon a certain number of desir-
able state services such as education, but service levels vary widely
across the United States due to varying state funding levels, which in
turn result from varying tax practices.'4' The idea is that the federal
government should bring some unity to tax bases and funding, either
by unifying taxes, collecting them and handing them back out to the
states, or by specifying tax bases and levels.142
As dramatic as these suggestions are, it is important to recog-
nize that they do not necessarily come from enemies of federalism. To
the contrary, Alice Rivlin, whose bias in many ways is toward provi-
sion of services at the state level, is one of the champions of this ap-
proach.43 But adopting such an approach would have a fairly signifi-
cant impact upon the way we think about federalism.
Finally, there is education. Perhaps no state service is consid-
ered more immune from federal regulation than this. States receive
assistance from the federal government, and comply with federal
guidelines and rules about discrimination, services for the physically
or mentally challenged, and the like.'" When it comes to curriculum
137. Falke, The Impact of the International System at 9-10 (cited in note 21).
138. See Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Calif., 114 S. Ct. 2268 (1994)
(rejecting a challenge to California's worldwide combined reporting requirement for calculating
corporate franchise taxes).
139. See Robert P. Strauss, Fiscal Federalism and the Changing Global Economy, 43 Natl
Tax J. 315, 317 (1990) (suggesting that as world-wide industry competition becomes more
competitive, "U.S. firms will become increasingly sensitive to the heterogeneity of the domestic
market... [and] to the level of taxation that is imposed").
140. Id.
141. See Alice Rivlin, The Challenge of Competition to Fiscal and Functional
Responsibilities, 16 Intergovernmental Perspective 15, 16 (Winter 1990).
142. Id. (suggesting that a system of "common taxes" in which taxes would be centrally
collected and shared by the states on a population basis); Strauss, 43 Natl Tax J. at 317-18
(cited in note 139) (proposing three state-ratified, federally defined tax bases for the three levels
of government). But see Shaviro, 90 Mich. L. Rev. at 961-62 (cited in note 132) (arguing that
federal government should mandate sources of taxation, but states should set tax rates to meet
varying funding choices for public goods).
143. Rivlin, 16 Intergovernmental Perspective at 16. President Clinton nominated Rivlin
as the head of the U.S. Office of Management and Budget in July, 1994.
144. See Du Pont, 16 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol. at 141-42 (cited in note 72).
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and teaching methodology, however, states and local governments
traditionally have gone their own way.45 But even here there is a
trend toward nationalization tied to globalization and competitive-
ness. 146 The argument is that in order for us to be competitive our
schools must pursue national curricular goals.
147
E. Human Rights and the States
Ironically, another area in which internationalization may
have an impact is human rights.148 I say ironically because the United
States fancies itself a world leader in this regard. 49 Yet, despite a
stated commitment to human rights, the United States has been re-
luctant to adopt international agreements on human rights.15 0 The
history of this reluctance traces directly back to congressional action
145. See id. at 142 (asserting that "[t]he power of state governments to deliver education to
their citizens and to decide upon the breadth and depth of the taxes they will extract from their
citizens go to the heart of governance").
146. See Clinton Signs Major Education Reform Bill, Chicago Tribune 6 (April 1, 1994)
(reporting the signing of a bill that establishes national curricular goals in order to make
America more competitive in international economy).
147. Id.
148. See Thomas Buergenthal, The U.S. and International Human Rights, 9 Human Rights
L. J. 141, 147 (1988) (noting that "internationalization of human rights is evidenced by the large
number of existing international human rights agreements that have been ratified by a sub-
stantial majority of the states comprising the international community").
149. See id. at 141 (noting the utilization by other countries as a legislative model the
substantial body of U.S. domestic law designed to promote enforcement of internationally
guaranteed human rights).
150. See id. (noting that compared to the majority of countries, the U.S. has ratified fewer
international human rights treaties); Winston P. Nagan, The Politics of Ratification: The
Potential for United States Adoption and Enforcement of the Convention Against Torture, The
Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 20 Ga. J.
Int'l & Comp. L. 311, 311 (1990) (commenting that U.S. ratification of international human
rights agreements "is a politically rare phenomenon").
For example, the U.S. has not yet ratified the following significant international agreements
on human rights: the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Lloyd N. Cutler, The Internationalization of
Human Rights, 1990 U. of Ill. L. Rev. 575, 581 n.17 (1990), the American Convention on Human
Rights; and the Genocide Convention. Buergenthal, 9 Human Rights L. J. at 142-43 (noting
that the Senate has ratified the Genocide Convention, but that legislation needed to implement
the Convention still awaits passage). The U.S. has ratified the Convention on the Political
Rights of Women and the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide. Cutler, 1990 U. of Ill. L. Rev. at 581 n.17. The United States was also a signatory of
the Helsinld Accords, which contained human rights provisions. See Conference on Security and
Co-operation in Europe: Final Act, Art. VII (August 1, 1975), reprinted in 14 Intl. Legal
Materials 1292 (1975).
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in the 1950s to avoid national obligations under treaties that might
have been thought to ban racial discrimination. 151
The debate over what United States adoption of various inter-
national human rights agreements might mean is vigorous, but there
are some quite interesting ideas bandied about. Commentators have
suggested that adoption of one treaty or another might lead to
challenges to corporal punishment in schools,152 the death penalty, 53
state homosexual sodomy laws,1M or perhaps even any laws that dis-
criminate on the basis of sexual orientation. Some commentators go
so far as to suggest these agreements may have an impact on the
status of "entitlements" such as welfare and education.155 Think what
you will about any one of these, in this area also international agree-
ments could serve to limit state diversity. 56
151. Thus the story of the "Bricker Amendment." After a lower state court suggested that
the human rights provisions of the United Nations charter were self-executing and that they
outlawed race discrimination, several senators supported an amendment by Senator John W.
Bricker that would have permitted no treaty to have the force of domestic law without imple-
menting legislation. In order to defeat the amendment, the Administration committed not to
become "a party to any such [human rights) covenant or present it as a treaty for consideration
by the Senate." Hearings On S.J. Res. 1 and S.J. Res. 43 Before A Subcomm. of the Senate
Comm. On the Judiciary, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11 (1953), quoted in Buergenthal, 9 Human
Rights L. J. at 146. Although the Kennedy Administration reversed the policy in 1963, its
effects linger. See generally Buergenthal, 9 Human Rights L. J. at 142-47; Covey T. Oliver, The
Treaty Power and National Foreign Policy as Vehicles for the Enforcement of Human Rights in
the United States, 9 Hofstra L. Rev. 411, 414 (1981) (noting that "the effort to eliminate racially
based discrimination by use of the treaty power induced something of a backlash in the halls of
Congress").
152. See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 702 n.5
(ALI, 1989) (suggesting this result).
153. See Cutler, 1990 U. of Il. L. Rev. at 588 (cited in note 150).
154. See, for example, id. at 587 & n.43 (questioning whether American courts would
uphold "the international human right of consenting adults to engage in private homosexual
conduct ," a position that the Supreme Court has heretofore refused to adopt as evidenced by
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)).
155. See Cutler, 1990 U. of Ill. L. Rev. at 588 (noting that some international conventions
contain "entitlement" human rights such as education, employment, health care, and welfare).
156. See Buergenthal, 9 Human Rights L. J. at 148 (cited in note 148); Lawrence M.
Friedman, Book Review, The Internationalization of Human Rights by David P. Forsythe, 13 B.
C. Third World L. J. 189, 196 (1993); Nagan, 20 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L. at 325-26 (cited in note
150) (arguing that limits on states in the area of human rights are not incompatible with the
fundamental goals of federalism); Oliver, 9 Hofstra L. Rev. at 431 (cited in note 151).
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IV. FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE STATES
[In respect of our foreign relations generally state lines disappear.... [The
states do] not exist.... [S]tate Constitutions, state laws, and state policies are
irrelevant...157
Before taking stock of the future of the American states in the
global community, it is instructive to examine the legal regime
governing the relationship of the states to the national government
when internationalization is the force narrowing state authority.
When nationalization is at issue, the governing law largely is the body
of cases under the Commerce Clause, preemption law, spending law,
and, of course, the decision in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority.158 Although this body of law is largely viewed as
solicitous to the federal government, when foreign affairs are at issue,
national authority is even greater. 15 9
Garcia probably is the bite noir of American federalism, rele-
gating the states as it does to the political process and ostensibly
eliminating any judicial protection against laws that limit state
regulatory autonomy. But in tone at least, Garcia was somewhat
respectful of the states, and left open the door to the possibility that
unstated protections existed. The Garcia Court acknowledged that
"[t]he States unquestionably do 'retai[n] a significant measure of
sovereign authority,'" '6 0 and insisted that "the States occupy a special
and specific position in our constitutional system.'' Perhaps most
important, the Court left open the hope, fulfilled to some extent in
New York v. United States,162 that the umpire might return at some
later date to lay down rules in protection of state sovereignty. Thus,
the Garcia Court concluded by observing that "[t]hese cases do not re-
quire us to identify or define what affirmative limits the constitu-
tional structure might impose on federal action affecting the States
under the Commerce Clause."' 63
157. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331-32 (1937).
158. 469 U.S. 528 (1985). See generally Du Pont, 16 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol. at 139-41
(cited in note 72); Farber and Hudec, 47 Vand. L. Rev. at 1411-17 (cited in note 15).
159. For a general background of national supremacy in the foreign relations sphere, see
Mendelson, 21 U. Miami Int-Am. L. Rev. at 84-90 (cited in note 114). See also, generally,
Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution (cited in note 65).
160. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 549 (alterations in the original) (quoting EEOC v. Wyoming, 460
U.S. 226,269 (Powell, J., dissenting)).
161. Id. at 556.
162. 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992) (finding unconstitutional a provision of the Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Reduction Act requiring states to accept ownership of waste or regulate
according to the instructions of Congress).
163. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 556.
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The case law that presently would govern state autonomy in a
globalized world offers none of the politesse of Garcia, nor does it
suggest much in the way of a limitation upon national authority. The
relevant cases largely are those dealing with the foreign relations
power of the United States, and with the authority of the national
government vis-a'-vis the states when the foreign affairs power has
been invoked. There are cases dealing with particular aspects of this
relationship, but the tone is best set in generalities. Perhaps the
strongest language, just to give an indication, comes from two cases,
United States v. Belmont 64 and United States v. Pink,'65 both of which
dealt with the refusal of New York courts to adhere to the terms of
the Litinov Agreement, resolving claims between the United States
and the Soviet Union. The Belmont Court put it this way:
In respect of all international negotiations and compacts, and in respect of our
foreign relations generally, state lines disappear. As to such purposes the
State of New York does not exist. Within the field of its powers, whatever the
United States rightfully undertakes, it necessarily has warrant to consum-
mate. And when judicial authority is invoked in aid of such consummation,
State Constitutions, state laws, and state policies are irrelevant to the inquiry
and decision.'
66
The basis of national authority vis-a'-vis the states in the area
of foreign policy is, according to the Supreme Court, quite different
from the domestic regulatory sphere. In the domestic arena, the
Tenth Amendment states the rules of the game: All powers not
granted to the national government are reserved to the states. 67 The
implicit presumption is that there are some powers not so granted,
thus so reserved. However diminished, the states necessarily retain
some role as to domestic regulatory affairs. Not so once foreign policy
enters the picture.168 The most famous statement of principles comes
164. 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
165. 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
166. Belmont, 301 U.S. at 331-32.
167. U.S. Const., Amend. X.
168. Commenting on the difference between the domestic regulatory sphere and foreign af-
fairs, one author noted:
Federalism... appeared irrelevant to the conduct of foreign affairs even before it began
to be a wasting force in American life generally-before we became one nation
economically, and moved toward welfare government disregarding state lines, before the
power of the States was theirs only by grace of Congress and by political realities rather
than constitutional compulsion.
Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution at 228 (cited in note 65). See also Harold G.
Maier, Preemption of State Law: A Recommended Analysis, 83 Am. J. Intl L. 832, 832-33 (1989)
(noting that "[t]he consensus today is that the central Government alone may directly exercise
power in foreign affairs").
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from a case not directly involving state authority, United States v.
Curtis-Wright Export Corp., 169 challenging Congress' delegation to the
Executive of the power essentially to criminalize the domestic sale of
weapons to certain foreign countries.170 To the argument that the
delegation to the President exceeded that permissible, the Supreme
Court responded as follows. First, the Court stated that it was
unnecessary to determine whether the delegation would have been
impermissible if it had related to domestic affairs, for this was a
different case.171 Second, the difference rested on important distinc-
tions between the national government's power in the domestic and
foreign arena.172 Third, in the domestic arena, Congress' power is
carved from power possessed by the states.173 Fourth, unlike domestic
power, the states never possessed the foreign affairs power; rather,
that power passed directly from Britain to the Union, where it resides
in full todayY74 And finally, "Lilt results that the investment of the
federal government with the powers of external sovereignty did not
depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution."'175
Missouri v. Holland 76 relied on this federal foreign affairs
power in providing the most clear analysis of the posture states find
themselves in when confronted with national power taken in pursu-
ance of foreign policy. 7 Missouri v. Holland involved a treaty en-
tered into by the United States with Great Britain protecting certain
migratory birds.1 8 The treaty was essential to national and interna-
tional interests: the birds were at that time a vital "pesticide" that
required protection. 79 The treaty, implemented by congressional
legislation, conflicted with Missouri's view of the proper regulation of
conduct toward the migratory birds, and so the State of Missouri
sued. 80 The state argued that whatever Congress' power in this area,
it was and could be no greater than the power Congress would have in
the absence of the treaty. 81 Not so, said the Court.
169. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
170. Id. at 314.
171. Id. at 315.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 316 (stating that carving out the legislative powers from the general mass of
powers held by the state was the primary purpose of the Constitution).
174. Id. at 316-17.
175. Id. at 318.
176. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
177. See id. at 432.
178. Id. at 430-31 ("Migratory Bird Treaty Act of July 3, 1918," c. 128, 40 Stat. 755).
179. See id. at 431.
180. Id. at 430-31.
181. Id. at 432.
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According to the Holland Court, the powers of Congress in the
foreign relations area are broader and less bounded than in the do-
mestic area.182 With regard to domestic regulation, the Tenth
Amendment operates, and Congress is limited to acting within the
scope of Article I, Section 8.18 "[T]he power to make treaties is
delegated expressly"'' to the United States, however, and while "Acts
of Congress are the supreme law of the land only when made in
pursuance of the Constitution,... treaties are declared to be so when
made under the authority of the United States."185 The Holland Court
continued:
We do not mean to imply that there are no qualifications to the treaty-making
power; but they must be ascertained in a different way. It is obvious that
there may be matters of the sharpest exigency for the national well being that
an act of Congress could not deal with but that a treaty followed by such an act
could, and it is not lightly to be assumed that, in matters requiring national
action, "a power which must belong to and somewhere reside in every civilized
government," is not to be found.
186
Holland is in many ways the McCulloch v. Maryland of foreign
affairs. Justice Holmes reminded us that the Constitution is a con-
stituent act, which brought to life a nation.1'5 "It was enough [for the
Framers] to realize or to hope that they had created an organism; it
has taken a century and has cost their successors much sweat and
blood to prove that they created a nation."'8 The treaty at issue did
not violate any express prohibition in the Constitution; "[t]he only
question is whether it is forbidden by some invisible radiation from
the general terms of the Tenth Amendment."' 89 Resolving this re-
quired considering "what this country has become in deciding what
that Amendment has reserved.... No doubt the great body of private
relations usually fall within the control of the State, but a treaty may
override its power.... Here a national interest of very nearly the
first magnitude is involved."' 9
In Holland, the national power was the treaty power, which
required action not only by the Executive, but also by two-thirds of
182. See id. at 433.
183. See id. at 432.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 433.
186. Id. (quotingAndrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14, 33 (1903)).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 433-34.
190. Id. at 433-35.
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the Senate,'9' ostensibly offering some Garciaesque political protec-
tion to the states. The next important question is how far that na-
tional power extends beyond the treaty power, i.e., the extent to which
executive agreements may govern the states.192 On this issue, too, the
Supreme Court is most generous to national authority. In the words
of the Curtis-Wright Court: "[T]he power to make such international
agreements as do not constitute treaties in the constitutional sense" is
vested in the United States, despite the fact that the power to make
such agreements is not "expressly affirmed by the Constitution." 93
Even if national political bodies have not clearly acted to pre-
empt the states, state law may be nonetheless preempted.94 Hines v.
Davidowitz 95 is a preemption case arising in the context of foreign
affairs. 96 In determining whether the state law was preempted, the
Court asked whether the state law stands as an obstacle to the ac-
complishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress. "And in that determination, it is of importance that this
legislation is in a field which affects international relations, the one
aspect of our government that from the first has been most generally
conceded imperatively to demand broad national authority. Any
concurrent state power that may exist is restricted to the narrowest of
limits."97
Moreover, even in the absence of national legislative or
executive action, state regulation will be trumped if the federal
judiciary deems the state law in conflict with the national foreign
policy. For example, Zschernig v. Miller 9 involved a state law
concerning the escheat of nonresident alien property to the state upon
death. 99 The state law did not conflict with treaty obligations, at
least insofar as they had been interpreted by the Supreme Court.200
And the Department of Justice, appearing as amicus, stated that the
191. U.S. Const., Art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
192. For a brief discussion of executive agreements as the supreme law of the land, see
Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution at 184-87 (cited in note 65).
193. Curtis-Wright, 299 U.S. at 318.
194. For a discussion of this issue and a proposed three-factor analysis for determining
whether a state law is preempted in such a situation, see Maier, 83 Am. J. Int'l L. 832 (cited in
note 168).
195. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
196. The state statute at issue in Hines involved state alien registration. Id. at 56.
197. Id. at 67-68. The Court subsequently struck down the statute even though it was
entirely consistent with the federal alien registration law. Id. at 66-67. The Court found that
"the regulation of aliens is... intimately blended and intertwined with the responsibilities of
the national government." Id.
198. 389 U.S. 429.
199. Id. at 430.
200. See id. at 432.
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state law did not "unduly interfere[ ] with the United States' conduct
of foreign relations."201 Nonetheless, the state statute fell because, in
application, it represented "an intrusion by the State into the field of
foreign affairs which the Constitution entrusts to the President and
the Congress."202
It is important to stress at this juncture that the point of this
discussion is not whether this very general survey of the law is nor-
matively correct. There are excellent reasons why when it comes to
foreign affairs the nation must speak with one voice, thus disabling
state regulatory policy to a certain extent.20 3 The point that deserves
notice is the impact of connecting the law surveyed in this section
with the events described in the last section. As the last section
makes clear, the field of what plausibly can be considered foreign
affairs is expanding greatly. It bears no coincidental resemblance to
the expansion of commerce power. As this survey shows, in the for-
eign affairs area, national authority is broad indeed. But if the na-
tional government's power in foreign affairs is great, and the area
that can be called foreign affairs is endlessly expansive, then state
autonomy is subject to serious compacting by the shrinking bounda-
ries of our global village. That presents the really important question:
what will be the fate of the states in the global community?
V. THE FUTURE OF FEDERALISM
Although it seems undeniable in light of the foregoing that
globalization will have some impact upon state regulatory autonomy,
it is difficult to assess exactly what that impact will be. In making
some rough predictions there are two different aspects of the problem
to consider. First, there is the question of substantive state authority:
to what extent will globalization limit state regulatory authority? The
second aspect may be even more significant, however; to what extent
will globalization have an impact upon the process of deciding where
201. Id. at 434 (quoting the Department of Justice brief amicus curiae). See also Maier, 83
Am. J. Intl L. at 836 (cited in note 168) (commenting that not one of the Court's conclusions
regarding interference with foreign relations was supported by the facts of the case).
202. Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 432 (citing Hines, 312 U.S. at 63). Some commentators have
termed the analysis taken by the Court in Zschernig as a doctrine of a "dormant" foreign
relations or foreign affairs power, by analogy to the "dormant" Commerce Clause doctrine. See
Bilder, 83 Am. J. Intl L. at 825 (cited in note 113); Mendelson, 21 U. Miami Int-Am. L. Rev. at
89 (cited in note 114).
203. For a brief summary of the main arguments for and against state action in the area of
foreign relations, see Bilder, 83 Am. J. Int'l L. at 827-29.
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regulatory authority rests? This latter question goes directly to our
democratic system of government: Who will decide whether regu-
latory authority rests in the national or state governments, and how
will that decision be reached?
In assessing the likely impact of globalization upon the sub-
stance of regulatory autonomy and the process of allocating that
authority, it is important to be precise about the shift of authority
that is likely to occur. By and large, when I speak of globalization I
am referring to a shift of authority from the states to the national
government that occurs because of globalizing forces. This is to be
distinguished from any claim of "global government." I leave entirely
to one side the idea of "world government."'204 Rather, I am interested
in the extent to which globalizing forces will cause a shift of authority
from state governments elsewhere, largely to the national
government. This shift necessarily will involve some displacement of
authority to international entities, such as the United Nations
organizations. But by and large, globalization's impact will be to
displace state regulatory autonomy to the national government.
Turning first to substantive regulatory authority, I cannot help
but predict that globalization will be the cause of a quite substantial
curtailment of state authority. This is not so very different, one might
argue, than what nationalization brought in its stead. In a sense, all
globalization does is bring even more authority to Congress and the
Executive, either because it no longer is politically necessary to re-
serve certain tasks to the states, or because the expanding interna-
tional market makes national uniformity all the more imperative.
Judicial deference to the national political branches with regard to
foreign affairs appears even to exceed that granted to Congress with
regard to domestic affairs under Garcia. Thus, internationalization
only continues what nationalization began: a diminution in the sepa-
rate sovereignty and independence of state government.
The impact of internationalization upon substantive authority
necessarily is only one of degree, and one might argue that the degree
of change will seem small in light of nationalization's influence upon
federalism in the roughly sixty years since the New Deal. Because
the states' regulatory autonomy is related directly to what Congress
has not been delegated, and because the process of nationalization has
exp nded greatly what is encompassed within Congress' power to
regulate interstate commerce, the area of autonomous state authority
204. See, for example, Ronald J. Glossop, World Federation? A Critical Analysis of Federal
World Government 49-95 (McFarland & Co., 1993).
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already has shrunk significantly. 2 5 But recall that we are on the
front end of a trend that has great potential to snowball. It is true
that GATT has been around for a while, but this latest round of the
GATT, European integration, and the NAFTA have not received the
enormous media, public, and scholarly attention they have because
little or nothing is happening. To the contrary, something quite sig-
nificant seems to be in the offing, and one of its costs may be a good
deal of state regulatory authority. Although one only can speculate as
to the precise extent to which globalization will curtail state regula-
tory authority, it would be a mistake to minimize that impact.
The impact of internationalization upon the process of allocat-
ing regulatory authority, however, may in the end prove most signifi-
cant. That impact is the concern of the balance of this Article. With
regard to assessing the impact globalization has on the process of
allocating governmental authority, there are two possible approaches.
First, one can examine how formal domestic law will treat the process
of allocating regulatory authority in a time of rapid globalization. But
ultimately more telling are the much less formal means by which
international agreements will play a role in curtailing state regula-
tory autonomy.
In order to determine how formal domestic rules play out re-
garding the allocation of regulatory authority, it may be instructive to
look for a moment more at the Garcia decision. Many in the academy
were critical of Garcia as providing an unrealistically optimistic view
of the political safeguards of federalism. The concern was that the
normal legislative process did not protect states' governmental inter-
ests.2  But even accepting the Garcia model in the domestic sphere,
it is clear the political safeguards model plays out somewhat differ-
ently when internationalization is the motivating force. That is be-
cause the way law is made under the foreign affairs power is very
different than the process by which it is made under an Article I,
Section 8 power.
At the outset, the President has a much greater and more
autonomous role where foreign relations are concerned.207 The
205. Moreover, after Garcia, it appears that any definition of state authority finally rests to
a significant extent in the Congress' hands.
206. For example, William R. Denny, Note, Breakdown of the Political Safeguards of
Federalism: A Response to Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 3 J. Law &
Pol. 749, 753-62 (1987).
207. See Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution at 37 (cited in note 65) (stating
"[s]tudents of American government, and citizens generally, know that American foreign
relations are in the charge of the President").
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Supreme Court has sanctioned the making of executive agreements,
which, when made on the sole authority of the President, still trump
state authority.2 8 Admittedly, few executive agreements are the
unilateral act of the President.29 But if and when they are, the ques-
tion is whether the Executive acting alone is likely to protect state
prerogatives. There is not much in the political process of electing a
President that suggests any particular sensitivity to state concerns.210
States find greater protection when the President acts in con-
junction with Congress, which can happen in any number of ways.
Executive agreements may be pursuant to congressional authoriza-
tion, may be ratified subsequently, and may be pursuant to the treaty
power.21' All these means call into play some of the protection Garcia
says ostensibly is available to the states in the bicameral legislative
process. In some instances states enjoy less protection, for example,
when the President simply consults with Congress before signing an
executive agreement. There are other instances when the protection
is just as great, or perhaps greater in the conduct of foreign affairs
than in domestic affairs, so long as the Executive and Congress work
together. Indeed, history has shown that the treaty process-which
requires a two-thirds vote of the Senate-may be more protective of
state autonomy than the ordinary legislative process. One reason for
this admittedly might be a certain number of jingoistic votes that
often appear in the Senate to oppose treaties, especially when any-
thing remotely involving human rights and social issues is involved.21 2
But whatever the reason, Senate consideration of treaties does seem
to protect to some extent the prerogatives of the states.
The question is whether differences in the formal process of
enacting foreign affairs laws that restrict state regulatory autonomy
208. For example, Belmont, 301 U.S. at 330-32.
209. See generally Dept. of State Circular 175: Procedures on Treaties, reprinted in 11
Foreign Affairs Manual 301, which discusses the instances in which executive agreements are
appropriate. The circular states that "[tihe term 'executive agreement' is appropriately reserved
for agreements made solely on the basis of the constitutional authority of the President," id. at
303, but lists international agreements made pursuant to treaty or legislation.
210. Although the Electoral College comes to mind, it has long since lost any value it might
have had in promoting the concerns of states qua states. While electoral politics may require a
President to play to certain large states, nothing about the College promotes neither state
interests generally, nor, specifically, an interest in placing regulatory authority at the state
level. Electors follow the decisions of the public at large, and that public will be pleased with a
candidate based on performance or promises to perform in ways that please the public. Absent
some sudden groundswell of public opinion in favor of transferring regulatory authority to the
states, the President will seek to regulate actively in ways that promote approval in the public
at large.
211. See note 209 (discussing Dept. of State Circular 175).
212. See notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
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will occasion a deviation from Garcia by the Supreme Court. As indi-
cated, differences in the lawmaking process might justify a deviation
in certain circumstances; for example, if the Executive acts alone.
That is because the rationale of Garcia seemed to take into account
the entire domestic political process as a protection for state interests.
But deviating from Garcia requires having some standard to apply,
which is tricky enough that the Supreme Court no doubt will not be
anxious to try. Moreover, judicial revision might require a return to
the pre-New Deal game of figuring out whether commerce-interna-
tional, this time-is affected by the conduct regulated by the national
government. The Court has shown no inclination to engage in this
inquiry domestically.213 Particularly given the Court's resort to broad
statements of national authority in the arena of international
relations, there does not appear to be any great hope that the
Supreme Court suddenly will step in to carve out areas of state
autonomy--or limit national authority-in the global village.
Indeed, the lessons from other federal countries suggest that
the Court will continue to grant greater deference in the foreign af-
fairs area. In Australia, for example, the national Supreme Court
gives a much narrower definition to the authority of the national
legislature vis-A-vis other member states in the realm of domestic
affairs.214 Nonetheless, the Australian court has granted huge author-
ity to the national government when legislation is enacted as an exer-
cise of the foreign affairs power.21 5
An examination of the formal law regarding allocation of regu-
latory authority fails even to begin to take into account the real prob-
lems of political accountability that occur when state autonomy is
narrowed through internationalization. Difficult questions arise
213. Accord Leslie Zines, Constitutional Change in the Commonwealth 94 (Cambridge U.,
1991) (discussing the problem of preserving state power in federal systems: "No general theory
of federalism can assist in the determination of the distribution of powers between the central
and regional governments").
214. Leslie Zines, The High Court and the Constitution 37-58 (Butterworths, 1981); Andrew
C. Byrnes, The Implementation of Treaties in Australia after the Tasmanian Dams Case: The
External Affairs Power and the Influence of Federalism, 8 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 275, 281
(1985).
215. This was the result of the celebrated Tasmania Dams Case, Commonwealth v.
Tasmania, 46 Aust. L. Rep. 625 (1983), in which the Australian High Court held that, under the
national government's external affairs power, the government could "carry out treaty obliga-
tions by means of domestic legislation regardless of the subject matter of the treaty," Byrnes, 8
B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. at 294, that is, without regard to limitations on the national govern-
ment's powers when acting purely in the domestic sphere. See generally Gary A. Rumble,
Federalism, External Affairs and Treaties: Recent Developments in Australia, 17 Case W. Res.
J. Int'l L. 1 (1985); Michael Coper, The Role of the Courts in the Preservation of Federalism, 63
Australian L. J. 463 (July, 1989).
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when state regulatory authority is narrowed by internationalizing as
opposed to nationalizing processes. One aspect of the GATT that has
come under some criticism provides a good example. When one coun-
try challenges the regulation of another country as a trade barrier,
the claim is litigated before a GATT panel. The panels operate in
secrecy, beyond public scrutiny.216 Moreover, states may not represent
themselves, but must be represented by the United States govern-
ment,217 which may have state interests at heart, but may also have a
different agenda. Thus, state interests may or may not be repre-
sented. Even if they are, the states may lose before a secret tribunal
accountable to no United States citizen.218  State compliance with a
panel decision may be achieved through constitutionally mandated
lawmaking precedents, 2 9 in which case the cause for concern is mini-
mized, if not eliminated entirely. But the executive branch may in-
stead decide to "encourage" state compliance in other ways, engender-
ing greater concern about democratic values.220
Indeed, this example emphasizes the unique way in which
internationalizing forces cause a subtle but definite shift of authority
within the national government from the legislative to the executive
branch, a shift that itself immunizes decision making from full politi-
cal accountability. As domestic law more and more becomes a func-
tion of internationalizing forces, that law increasingly will be shaped
by international agreements. But as we already have seen, once the
216. Schaefer and Singer, 26 J. of World Trade at 34 (cited in note 7) (noting that GATT
panel "briefs are considered confidential").
217. "Where is no requirement for states to be made aware of, or participate in, the
formation of the United States position when it is state regulations or other practices that are
under challenge." Id.
218. See Jackson, World Trade at 187-89 (cited in note 63) (describing how GATT operates
only through governments and does not have a direct relationship with private citizens).
219. Concededly, compliance with a GATT panel decision is not a foregone conclusion. As
Farber and Hudec point out, however, there is no sense in taking the GATT seriously if compli-
ance is not assumed. Farber and Hudec, 47 Vand. L. Rev. at 1407 (cited in note 15).
220. In the aftermath of the Beer H decision, the "federal government is working with the
affected states to eliminate the laws found to violate GATT." Weiler, 20 Intergovernmental
Perspective at 39 (cited in note 74). While the federal government has the constitutional
authority to use its constitutional powers to secure compliance with the GAT by local govern-
ments, Schafer and Singer, 26 J. World Trade at 32 (cited in note 7), to the best of my knowl-
edge "working with the affected states" does not mean passage of legislation pursuant to consti-
tutional means. Nonetheless, absent a Twenty-first Amendment problem such legislation would
be constitutional, and because under GATT "the federal government will be obliged to override
the State measure in question if the state does not voluntarily comply with the ruling," id., the
threat of legislative preemption gives the executive branch tremendous power, exercised largely
in a behind-the-scenes and thus relatively unaccountable fashion. See notes 207-10 and
accompanying text discussing the enhancement of executive authority. See also Jackson, World
Trade at 187-89 (cited in note 63) (addressing executive branch decision making as to whether
to pursue a private citizen's claim).
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forum for policymaking shifts from the domestic to the international,
the Executive begins to play a paramount role.221 Thus, as globaliza-
tion proceeds, executive power will be enhanced simply because of the
nature of the decisions being made. This has, in fact, been the experi-
ence in Western Europe as integration occurs there: executive
authority has increased vis-a-vis the legislative bodies.2
22
Moreover, concerns about democratic accountability are
heightened when domestic regulation is structured according to inter-
national standards. An example is a GATT challenge brought under
the technical barriers or sanitary and phytosanitary agreements.
Under those agreements, the baseline for regulatory authority is
existing international standards. 223 A state that seeks to impose regu-
lations more stringent than prevailing international standards bears
a heavy burden of justification.224 But this only compounds the ques-
tions raised above about unaccountable tribunals. After all, who is it
that drafted these standards? Unlike domestic standards set by the
Congress, there may be no democratic accountability for those stan-
dard-setters.
225
221. See notes 207-10 and accompanying text.
222. Alberta M. Shragia, Thinking About the European Future: The Uses of Comparison, in
Alberta M. Sbragia, ed., Euro-Politics: Institutes and Policymaking in the "New" European
Community 257, 274 (The Brookings Institution, 1992); Shirley Williams, Sovereignty and
Accountability in the European Community in Keohane and Hoffmann, eds., The New European
Community, 155, 158-59 (cited in note 6).
223. See note 86.
224. See note 87.
225. See Du Pont, 16 Harv. J. of Law & Pub. Pol. at 143 (cited in note 72) (stating that
"[flederalization of our child support system, as unwelcome as it might be, at least leaves deci-
sions in the hands of a federal government that is our government. It is something else again to
turn over local power to enhance product safety and environmental quality to faceless
GATTeers in placid Geneva"). Professor Trimble thus levels sharp criticism at those who favor
an international body to enforce GATT rules in favor of industry when domestic legal processes
constrain implementation. See Phillip R. Trimble, International Trade and the "Rule of Law,"
83 Mich L. Rev. 1017 (1985). Professor Trimble's comments come in the context of a book
review of John H. Jackson, Jean-Victor Louis, and Mitsuo Matsushita, Implementing the Tokyo
Round: National Constitutions and International Economic Rules (U. of Mich., 1984). The
authors suggest that the ability to negotiate and implement free trade agreements is hindered
by domestic politics and political institutions. Trimble makes the broad point that arguing for a
way to circumvent domestic political processes to achieve free international trade is putting the
cart before the horse. Even "itfhe authors of course recognize that free trade values are not the
only concern of government." Id. at 1028. Trimble points out that the governments studied "are
in one way or another representative governments. Their legitimacy and ability to maintain
their authority depends on a measure of voluntary acceptance of their actions by their people."
Id. at 1025. Trimble therefore takes issue with the suggestion of a "supercourt" to adjudicate
GATT disputes over the heads of governments: "[t]he kind of international law making envi-
sioned by the authors cannot easily be reconciled with American political tradition." Id. at 1027.
The phenomenon Trimble identifies is prominent. For example, discussing regional inte-
gration mechanisms ("RIM"), Frederick Abbott writes: "No single juridical mechanism will
alone create a deep regional integration. According a self-executing character to RIMs may
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This very transfer of authority from national governments and
the concomitant loss of democratic control have been documented by
commentators on the process of European integration. As Europe
integrates, those commentators have observed a "democracy deficit,"226
in which power shifts from national legislatures to community bu-
reaucratic entities electorally unaccountable to the public. It is at
least less than obvious that this situation is desirable in the United
States.
I do not want to overstate the case, for even disregarding rapid
globalization, many national regulations (globalization aside) that
curtail states' regulatory autonomy are implemented in a relatively
unaccountable fashion. For example, many rules are made by civil
servants serving almost for life, acting pursuant to broad delegations
of congressional authority. Other state laws fall victim to decisions by
the federal courts, whose judges also are not popularly elected or
directly accountable. But at least there is in these other instances
some indirect accountability.227 It is somewhat more difficult to see
how the political process operates to preserve democratic values when
general international agreements to harmonize lead to specific GATT
panel decisions that declare state laws inconsistent with free trade.
Concern about accountability and the impact of internationali-
zation on domestic law is finding increasing statement by commenta-
tors. 8 Vociferous attack on trade regulation has come from environ-
mentalists who see health and safety swapped for elimination of trade
restraints.229 Environmentalists argue that adhering to international
facilitate the process in several ways. First, if a RIM takes domestic effect without the
requirement of implementing legislation, the tendency of national legislatures to interfere with
or restructure the arrangement will be diminished, thereby increasing the prospect that the
norms established by the RIM will be interpreted and applied consistently among the
constituent member states" 1 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. at 158 (cited in note 6)
226. See Williams, Sovereignty and Accountability at 162-64 (cited in note 222) (analyzing
"democratic deficit"); Sbragia, European Future at 278 (cited in note 222) (reporting concerns
that the "link between voter and policymaker' should be more direct); Karl Kaiser,
Transnational Relations as a Threat to the Democratic Process, in Robert 0. Keohane and
Joseph S. Nye, Jr., eds., Transnational Relations and World Politics 356, 367 (Harvard U., 1972)
(discussing reduction of "democratic control").
227. A classic defense of the accountability of civil servants is found in Alexander M. Bickel,
The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics (Yale U., 1962). For a
criticism of Bickel's argument, as well as an argument that even life-tenured judges are rela-
tively accountable, see Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 577,
612-13 (1993).
228. For example, Du Pont, 16 Harv. J. Law & Pub. Pol. at 16 (cited in note 72); Weiler, 20
Intergovernmental Perspective at 39-40 (cited in note 74); Schaefer and Singer, 26 J. World
Trade at 32-34 (cited in note 7).
229. See, for example, the Symposium in the Washington and Lee Law Review,
"Environmental Quality and Free Trade: Interdependent Goals or Irreconcilable Conflict?" 49
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standards will lead to lowest-common-denominator regulation.
Although one might disagree as to whether these arguments are
somewhat intemperate or overstated,230 the validity of the underlying
concerns is conceded even by free trade advocates.231 They can offer
no certain answer because at present there simply is none to be had.
It simply is too early to tell what impact internationalizing processes
will have.
In fairness, it is not as though globalization comes without its
advocates and arguments. Globalization promises free trade, stronger
economies, better times for many in need, closer ties, less conflict and
strife, and, if none of these, then, at least a better economy at home.02
It is difficult to be against these things. Moreover, in a sense, any
debate about state (or even national) autonomy to protect citizens
versus globalization and harmonization already has been fought and
won. The future is upon us.
Nonetheless, globalization has its soft underside: the current
enthusiasm to integrate may underestimate individual attachment to
local community. As globalization proceeds, power shifts to higher-
level national governments.233 Moreover, as we have seen, those na-
tional governments increasingly are making decisions in conformity
with other decisions made in seats of power ever more remote from
the people.m4 In addition, because the entire regime of international
decision making enhances executive power and executive action taken
in conformity with international obligations, 235 chains of accountabil-
ity to individuals are noticeably weakened. The distancing of govern-
ance and weakening of accountability inevitably will lead to govern-
ment increasingly remote from its citizens. My prediction-and pre-
dicting is all we can do at this point-is that the very immensity of
the global village will serve in the long run to alienate its citizens. I
mean alienation in a quite literal sense: estranged citizens will see
the global community, and the national government that imposes
Wash. and Lee L. Rev. 1219 (1992); see generally the discussion in Farber and Hudec, 47 Vand.
L. Rev. at 1409-10 (cited in note 15).
230. See Farber and Hudec, 47 Vend. L. Rev. at 1410.
231. See John H. Jackson, World Trade Rules and Environmental Policies: Congruence or
Conflict, 49 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1227, 1256-57 (1992) (agreeing conflict exists between trade
and environmental goals, and noting concerns heightened by lack of participation options in
international trade rule formulation).
232. See, for example, Abbott, 1 Ind. J. Glob. Legal Stud. at 157-58 (cited in note 6)
(arguing that regional integration promotes social interaction, political cooperation, and wealth
generation).
233. See notes 6-20 and accompanying text.
234. See notes 223-31 and accompanying text.
235. See notes 207-30 and accompanying text.
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international rules, as alien from them, and from what they care
about.
It is within this possible alienation of government from the
governed, therefore, that federalism might find its hope for the future.
It could well be that our federal system will become, or already is, an
anachronism. But by the same token, as people find government
further away and less accessible, they may seek to find mechanisms of
governance more accountable and closer to home. And in that event,
the structures of the federal system-most notably the
states-remain in place and available to meet the challenge.
Evidence of the strong attachment to local community is all
about us, some of it quite painful. Others have observed that even as
the world around us unites, there is a dreadful splintering going on.26
In the face of the collapse of the strong Soviet government, ethnic
strife and nationalism are the currency of the day, with the news
constantly full of national breakdowns along old tribal lines. The
horrible events in Bosnia are perhaps the best-known or most fol-
lowed examples of fragmentation in the face of a loss of strong central
control. One can see in these events the weaknesses of global order.
One good example of the phenomenon I have in
mind-internationalization prompting strengthened adherence to
local community-is happening in the European Union even as inte-
gration is taking place. The whole idea of the Union teetered during
the ratification votes, as the Maastricht treaty ran into stiffer opposi-
tion than expected. 237 Experts in integration of the EU are still debat-
ing exactly what sentiment the voters were expressing, but the formal
response is the idea of subsidiarity. Subsidiarity is the EU's slogan
for what apparently is necessary to appease those jittery about the
community; it generally holds that whatever needs to be done in the
way of governance should occur at the lowest level of government
possible.21 Attachments to local government understandably run
236. See Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations?, 72 Foreign Affairs 22
(Summer, 1993). A particularly poignant discussion of this trend, in an important article on the
impact of globalization upon democracy, is Barber, 1 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. at 121-24 (cited
in note 5). For an informative and evocative account of the historical forces driving the process
of re-Balkanization, see Robert D. Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts (St. Martin's, 1993).
237. See Patrick Oster, New EC Dawns with a Yawn, Newsday 20 (Nov. 3, 1993)
(discussing how Maastricht ran into opposition and reporting that even after Maastricht was in
effect, one commentator suggested, "People don't believe in Maastricht.... If we had a vote on
it today, I don't think it would be approved").
238. Antonio Lo Faro, EC Social Policy and 1993: The Dark Side of European Integration?,
1 Comp. Lab. L. 1, 16-17 (1992); Colin Brown, Britain to Challenge EC, The Independent 1, 1
(April 21, 1992) (defining subsidiarity as "the doctrine under which member states have the
right to take decisions at local level").
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deep in the EU. Although the protests of French farmers easily can
be attributed to economic self-interest,29 the protests expressing
concern about, say, the loss of French culture24 speak to something
quite different.241
But the phenomenon is not limited to those abroad. We have
evidence of it right here at home. As government emanates more and
more from Washington, there is a sense of unease shared by many
people. Even though its performance bore no relationship to its prom-
ise, this was, in part, what Ronald Reagan's New Federalism was all
about. And if more evidence is needed, look to the startling popular-
ity of Ross Perot as a third-party Presidential candidate in 1992.242 At
least one force driving that campaign was a sense that government
had lost sight of the people it was governing, or perhaps that the
governed were becoming just that, losing rein on their government.
The Framers understood all of this, its good side and its bad.
This Symposium is primarily forward-looking, but as Larry Kramer
has argued, we ought not to look ahead without glancing backward.243
The Framers understood the loyalties of people to local government,
and in part sought to break the back of those attachments, forming
new attachments to a new government that would not be as subject to
parochial interests.244  But the Framers, or some of
George Bermann has written two excellent pieces on subsidiarity, George A. Bermann,
Subsidiarity and the European Community, 17 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 97 (1993) and
George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community
and the United States, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 331 (1994). Bermann makes the important point that
the subsidiarity principle does not address "meaningfully . . . the states' capacity to deal
adequately with a regulatory problem because the regulatory problem is not the issue."
Bermann, 17 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. at 109. Rather, "[t]he issue is whether and to what
extent the Community's unquestioned interest in creating and improving the common market
justifies restricting the states' otherwise unfettered right to regulate whatever regulatory
problem is at hand." Id. at 109-10.
239. For example, Eugene Weber, French Pride Gummed Up the GATT Talks, Newsday 32
(Jan. 9, 1994) (discussing French farmers' protests to protect economic well-being).
240. For example, Hollywood Fighting European Effort to Curb U.S. Films, Chicago
Tribune 3 (Nov. 22, 1990) (discussing U.S. response to French arguments about influx of U.S.
culture).
241. Accord Barber, 1 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. at 136 (cited in note 5) (stating "[to the
degree that the new Europe has ignored political participation in favor of commercial and
technological integration, it too risks long-term failure").
242. For a discussion of Perot's popularity during the 1992 Presidential campaign, see, for
example, Walter Shapiro, He's Ready, But Is America Ready for PRESIDENT PEROT?, Time 26
(May 25, 1992); Howard Fineman, Throwing a Mighty Tantrum, Newsweek 28 (April 27, 1992).
243. Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 1485, 1493, 1560-61
(1994).
244. For example, Federalist No. 10 (Madison) in Clinton Rossiter, ed., The Federalist
Papers 77, 81-84 (Mentor, 1961) (describing how expanding the sphere of government
counteracts faction).
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them-particularly those who lost-also understood that good
citizenship involves participation, and that it is awfully difficult to
participate in a government whose seat is far away.245 Imagine the
reaction of the anti-federalists to seats of decision making-if not
power-not in the national capital, but across oceans, on foreign
shores.
It is not necessary to enter the debate on the merits of regional
or global integration in order to see my point, which is only that as
the process of globalization progresses, and as people find decisions
made for them by governments and decision makers farther away and
less accountable, they are likely to become discontent. It is possible
that by the time of discontent we also will be so comfortable with our
shiny space cars and our modern homes, that we will do no more than
grumble occasionally. But it is equally possible, and perhaps highly
desirable, that discontent with remote government will reinvigorate
local governance as well.
Indeed, a revitalization of federal principles may be perfectly
consistent with globalization.24 6 Many argue that the best governance
is one that optimizes the governing abilities of each level of govern-
ment. Even as the world gets smaller, and government more global,
there will remain some things better done at home. Better might
mean more efficiently, such as registering voters or seeing that the
trash is collected and the streets paved. But better also might mean
"more accepted by the public." Public school curricula come to mind
here. A national curriculum might be a useful thing for education,
but will the local communities have it?247 It is these areas of local
regulation that hold the promise for federalism.
What is significant about this bottom-up return to federal val-
ues is that it does not depend so heavily on the legal order and ques-
tions such as whether Garcia will be overturned. What will revive
and remake federalism, if it is to happen, is action by the People. The
245. See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 Yale L. J. 1539, 1555-57
(1988) (discussing republican values of citizenship and participation, most available in small
local assemblies).
246. Benjamin Barber is particularly optimistic in his assessment of the good some form of
federal assembly can do in parts of the world that are fragmenting politically due to ethnic or
cultural difference. See Barber, 1 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. at 132-34 (cited in note 5)
(discussing utility of federalism and confederalism as means of bringing disparate peoples
together politically).
247. Interestingly, in discussing European integration, Professor Williams suggests that
ties to the broader community might be fostered in schools, "but many member states fiercely
defend their own turf when it comes to education, which is not within the Community's juris-
diction." Williams, Sovereignty and Accountability, in Keohane and Hoffman, eds., The New
European Community at 170 (cited in note 222).
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very flip side of my view regarding the alienation that global govern-
ment will engender is that from the ground up people will begin to act
at the state and local level.248 People frustrated with national educa-
tion standards will get elected to school boards and work for local
autonomy. People unhappy with internationally mandated food label-
ing maxima will agitate for the authority to make these decisions at
the local level. People will pay more attention to Town Hall and City
Hall, and to the State House. And if this happens, then federalism
will find its own new center.
And if not, then it will not.
248. An idea of areas in which state control might properly predominate could be taken
from the European Community: "Other issues that most closely engage individuals and fami-
lies, like health, housing, social services, and school education, remain firmly within national
jurisdiction." Id.
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